In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 14th day of April 1989
S.C. 229/1986
Between
Chief Gani Fawehinmi ....... Appellant
And
Nigerian Bar Association
Chief F.R.A. Williams. S.A.N.
Chief E.A. Molajo. S.A.N. ....... Respondents
Kehinde Sofola. S.A.N.
General Council of the Bar
No 1
Judgement of the Court
Delivered by
Andrews Otutu Obaseki. J.S.C
On the 17 th day of January, 1989, I overruled the objection of the appellant to the hearing of the addresses of Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N., E. A. Molajo, S.A.N and Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. (and more particularly, Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. who appeared as counsel for the Nigerian Bar Association and Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. (and Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N.), who appeared as counsel for ChiefF. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. and Mr. E. A. Molajo, S.A.N.) from the Bar and reserved my reasons till today. I now proceed to give them.
On the 4th day of October, 1988 when this appeal came up for hearing, appearances were announced as follows from the Bar:
Appelant in person
Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N.
(with him, Uche Nwokedi) For the Nigerian Bar Association and Kehinde Sofola S.A.N.
Sofola S.A.N.
(with him Miss O.A. Obaseki and M.A.O. Okupe) For Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.a.N. and Chief E.A. Molajo. S.A.N.
Mr. O. Adio.
(Director of Civil Litigation,
Federal Ministry of Justice, Lagos) For 5th Respondent (General Council of the Bar)
Chief Gani Fawehinmi, the appellant, was then called on to argue his appeal. He informed the Court that he had filed a brief of argument and that he relied entirely on the submissions contained therein. He then elaborated on some of the points made in the brief after giving a brief narration of the facts. He went on and concluded his argument in the appeal. At the close of his submission, further hearing in the appeal was adjourned to 8th November, 1988, counsel for the Respondents having applied earlier for adjournment. At the adjourned date, the case was called. Then the appellant and counsel for the Respondents announced their appearance as follows:
Appelant in person
Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N.
(with him, B.O. Ogundipe. Esq and O.M. Ayeni (Mrs)) For the Nigerian Bar Association and Kehinde Sofola S.A.N.
Sofola S.A.N.
(with him Miss O.A. Obaseki and M.A.O. Okupe) For Chief F.R.A. Williams, S.a.N. and Chief E.A. Molajo. S.A.N.
Mr. O. Adio.
(Director of Civil Litigation,
Federal Ministry of Justice, Lagos) For 5th Respondent (General Council of the Bar)
Thereafter, the Court called on counsel for the Respondents to present their reply to the arguments of Chief Gani Fawehinmi, the appellant, if any. As Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N., rose to his feet to address the Court from the Bar, Chief Gani Fawehinmi rose to his feet and objected to either Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. or Kehinde Sofola. S.A.N. addressing the Court from the Bar; his main ground being that they are parties to the proceedings. Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. suggested that it would be of great assistance to the resolution of the issue if briefs were ordered to be filed and served setting out in full the arguments of counsel in respect of this objection as it is a novel point that is now being raised. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. was of the same view. Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. was however prepared to address the court from the well of the court outside the Bar to avoid further adjournment of the hearing and determination of the appeal.
On a proper consideration of the matter, we, the Court, decided to order and did order the filing of briefs setting out the arguments of the parties in respect of this objection. Further hearing of the appeal was then adjourned to the 17th day of January, 1989. Briefs were duly filed and served. I read the briefs studiously and when the case came up for further hearing on the 17th day of January, 1989, we saw no need to call on the parties and counsel for amplification of their submissions in the brief. I then overruled the objection and upheld the right of Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. and the right of Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. to address the Court from the Bar.
The appellant utilised the opportunity offered by the order for briefs to be filed to formalise his objection in writing to read:
"1. That it is not competent for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents who are barristers and parties in this appeal to conduct their cases from the Bar and to be fully robed when addressing the court;
2. That it is not competent for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents who are parties in this case to appear both in person and as counsel to another party in the appeal which concerns the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents in their personal capacities;
3. That it is not competent for any of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents to appear as counsel to any other party in this appeal since they are parties in this appeal which concerns the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents in their personal capacities."
The ground of objection stated by the appellant in his brief is that:
the appearances of the 2nd and 3rd Respondent" (i.e. Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. and Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N.) '~if allowed as announced on 8th November, 1988 will not be in accord with their professional role and duty to the court as counsel" arguing a case before the highest court of the land and furthermore the appearances will not be in the tradition of the legal profession."
For this objection, the appellant relied in the main, on the case of Ajide V. Kelani (1985) 3 N.W.L.R. (Part 12) 248 at 257-258. This case dealt with the need to give notice and grounds of the objection in writing and in particular the interpretation of the Rule of Court Order 2 Rule 9(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985.
Four issues were formulated by the appellant as arising for consideration and resolution. They are:
(1) whether a party who is also a legal practitioner can appear for himself and conduct the case from the Bar (in a lawyer's robe);
(2) whether a party who is also a legal practitioner can appear for another party in the same suit as a legal practitioner and conduct the other parties' case from the Bar;
(3) whether a legal practitioner who is a party in a case can appear in person and as counsel to another party in the case arguing their cases out of the Bar (i.e. in the well of the court),
(4) what is the implication on issues 2 and 3 of section 33(6)(c) of the 1979 Constitution, i.e. on the right of an accused in a criminal case to a legal practitioner of his choice?
Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. formulated the questions for determination in his brief filed on behalf of the Nigerian Bar Association and Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. differently as follows:
(1) whether it would be proper for the Supreme Court to refuse to permit Chief Rotimi Williams, S.A.N. or Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. to represent the Nigerian Bar Association.
Put more fully, this question reads as follows:
whether the plaintiff at whose instance 3 legal practitioners were prohibited from appearing for the 1st Defendant by an order of injunction which was subsequently discharged by the Court of Appeal is entitled to insist that the Supreme Court must not allow two of the said legal practitioners to appear for the 1st Defendant at hearing of an appeal by the plaintiff from decisions of the Court of Appeal:
(2) where the Court of Appeal in the course of its judgment decided that the High Court, ought not to have barred Defendant's counsel from further appearance in a case and also found, contrary to the decision of the High Court, that the 1st Defendant was not a juristic person and accordingly struck out the action, in an appeal by the plaintiff to the Supreme Court from both decisions
(a) is the plaintiff entitled to insist that the counsel who had succeeded in convincing the Court of Appeal that the bar imposed on him by the High Court was wrong, should be barred from representing the Defendant in the appeal?
(b) must the counsel concerned cease to function as such for the purpose of replying to the plaintiff's appeal to have the bar imposed on counsel restored?
Mr. Kehinda Sofola, S.A.N. formulated the issues for determination still slightly differently as follows:
(a) whether a party to a civil suit who is also a legal practitioner can appear for himself and conduct his case from the Bar;
(b) whether such a party can also appear for another person, who is a coDefendant with him and conduct the other party's case from the Bar;
(c) whether in the latter case he can do so at all events from the Bar.
Mr. M. 0. A. Adio adopted the issues formulated by Mr. Kehinda Sofola, S.A.N. as the issues for determination in this objection.
Issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 formulated by Chief Gani Fawehinmi arise from the objection. Issue No.4 does not arise for determination in this objection.
Issue No. (1) formulated by Chief F. R. A. Williams does not arise but issues No. (2) could have been differently formulated to bring out the substance of the objection.
Issues (a), (b) and (c) formulated by Mr. Kehinde Sofola arise for determination and best expressed the pith of the objection.
Before dealing with these issues, it is desirable to give a brief narration of the relevant facts.
The appellant, by originating summons dated 19th day of November, 1984 instituted an action against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, i.e. (1) The Nigerian Bar Association and (2) the General Council of the Bar in the Lagos State High Court holden at Lagos. The appellant claimed for determination the following questions:
(1) whether (within the context of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as affected by Decree No.1 of 1984, the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association; the Legal Practitioners Act 1975; the Rules of Professional Conduct in the Legal Profession, made by the General Council of the Bar) the 1st Defendant is legally competent take a decision to boycott the special Military Tribunal established under Decree No.3 of 1984 Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree 1984;
(2) whether the appearance of the plaintiff before the special Military Tribunal Lagos Zone is legally and professionally proper and justifiable (within the context of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as affected by Decree No.1 of 1984, the Constitution of the Nigerian Bar Association, the Legal Practitioners Act 1975; the Rule of Professional Conduct in the Legal Profession made by the General Council of the Bar)
(3) whether, by virtue of section 1 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1975, the 1st Defendant is competent to direct the affairs of the Legal Practitioners in Nigeria on the matter of appearance before the Special Military Tribunals established under Decree No.3 of 1984 Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal) Decree, 1984 without prior approval and/or authority of the 2nd Defendant?"
AND the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs:
(l) A declaration that the decision of the Nigerian Bar Association taken as its National Executive Meeting in Jos in April, 1984 and ratified at an emergency general meeting on the 8th day of May, 1984 in Lagos that its members must not appear before the special Military Tribunals established under Decree No 3 of 1984-Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Decree, 1984 is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever;
(2) A declaration that the decision of the Nigerian Bar Association taken at the meeting of its National Executive Committee held in Lagos on the 2nd and 3rd November, 1984 on the issue of members (of the Nigerian Bar Association) appearing before the Special Military Tribunal particularly the decision on the plaintiff is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever'
When the matter came up for hearing on Thursday, the 19th day of February, 1985, the plaintiff now appellant appeared in person. Benson, S.A.N. with Aloghe appeared as counsel for 1st Defendant. Also appearing with Benson S.A.N. were Segun Onakoya, Dan Kukoyi and A. Adeyinka. The record then reads (p. 120):
Benson says I was instructed in this matter last Saturday. Counter-affidavit filed not yet officially served on the plaintiff. I intend to take further steps to regularise the matter before the court; asks for time to complete preparations for the case. Chief Gani Fawehinmi replies opposing the application for adjournment."
The learned trial Judge, Ademola Johnson, Ag. Chief Judge, Lagos State, after some adverse comments, granted the application for adjournment and fixed hearing for 19th and 20th March, 1985. On the 19th day of March, 1985, the parties appeared and appearances as recorded in the record of proceedings read:
"Parties present
Chief Williams, S.A.N. with Messrs. E. A. Molajo, S.A.N. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N., Chief B. 0. Benson, S.A.N., Segun Onakoya and S. A. Adewolu for 1st Defendant. Chief Williams requests that this matter be continued as if it were commenced by a writ (of summons) and urges the court to order pleadings."
After addressing the court on the reasons for his application, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, the plaintiff, replied and maintained that the matter was properly begun by originating summons.
After hearing arguments of the plaintiff and counsel for the Defendants on the application, the learned trial Judge, Ademola Johnson, Ag. C.J. adjourned for Ruling to be delivered on 16th April, 1985. On the 16th day of April, 1985, the learned trial Judge, Ademola Johnson, J. deliverd his Ruling the closing sentence of which reads:
"I therefore rule that this matter is better proceeded with by the order of pleadings and I now order that pleadings be filed within a period of time to be agreed upon by the parties with the court's concurrence."
He then gave the plaintiff7 days within which to file his statement of claim and the Defendants 30 days from service of ihe statement of claim in which to file their statement of defence.
The plaintiff filed his statement of claim dated 22nd day of April, 1985 on that date and on 29th April, 1985, he filed a motion on notice for an order of interlocutory injunction restraining Chief F. R. A. Williams S.A.N., Mr. Kehinde Sofola and Mr. E. A. Molaio, S.A.N. from acting or from continuing to act for the Nigerian Bar Association. The terms of the motion paper reads as follows:
Motion on Notice
Brought under
The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court
Take Notice that this Honourable Court will be moved on Monday the 3th day of May, 1985 at the hour of 9 o'clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as the plaintiff/applicant can be heard for:
An order of interlocutory injunction
restraining Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N., Mr. Kehinda Sofola, S.A.N. and Mr. E. A. Molajo, S.A.N.from acting or from continuing to act or from representing or from continuing to represent the Nigerian Bar Association, the 1st Defendant in this suit on the ground that their appearance or representation for the Nigerian Bar Association is improper, unprofessional, dishonourable and dishonest.
And for such further order or orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.
(1) The Nigerian Bar Association, (2) The General Council of the Bar, (3) Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N., (4) Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. and (5) Mr. E. A. Molajo, S.A.N. were put on Notice. The motion was supported by affidavit evidence and exhibits filed along with it. Notice of preliminary objection to the motion served on Chief F. R. A. Williams, S .A N. was on 10th day of May, 1985 filed by Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. counsel to Chief F. R. A. Williams S.A.N.
On the 13th day of May, 1985, notice of motion for an order striking out the name of the 1st Defendant from the suit and striking Out the whole action was filed by Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. counsel for the 1st Defendant. On the 27th day of May, 1985, the motions came up for hearing but were adjourned to 30th May, 1985 for hearing. Parties appeared on the 30th day of May, 1985 and the appearances on record of proceedings read:
Plaintiff present
Chief Williams, S.A.N. for Nigerian Bar Association with Messrs. Molajo, S.A.N., K. Sofola, S.A.N., Bola Ajibola, Tunji Gomez, Segun Onakoya, Ladi Williams, Olajide Adeogun, Mustapha and C. F. Ogundere (Miss),
K. Sofola, S.A.N. appears for Chief Williams with Ladi Williams, Mustapha and Miss. C. F. Ogundere also appear in person.
Molajo, S .A. N. appears as one of the persons named.
Sofola says, 'I shall wait and reply to the submissions of Fawehinmi and rely on the issues raised in the preliminary point by way of reply.
Molajo adopts same system as Sofola
Chief Gani Fawehinmi addresses
Chief Williams replies
Hearing could not be concluded on the 30th day of May, 1985 50 it continued on the 31st day of May, 1985. Appearances as recorded in the record of proceedings for that day read:
Plaintiff present
Molajo, S.A.N., K. Sofola, S.A.N., Ladi Williams, Tunji Gomez, Miss Ogundere, Mustapha led by Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. for the Nigerian Bar Association.
Sofola, S.A.N. for Chief Williams with Ladi Williams, Mustapha, Miss. Ogundere, Debayo Doherty, A. 0. Aniagolu and in person for himself.
Molajo also appears for himself as a person cited.
Molajo addresses. Sofola now addresses associates himself with Chief Williams, S.A.N. and Molajo, S.A.N. and all they have said.
Chief Gani Fawehinmi replies."
As hearing could not be concluded that day, the case was adjourned to 6th June, 1985 for further hearing. On that day, Chief Gani Fawehinmi continued and concluded his reply. He then submitted copies of his address to the court. Then Chief Williams asked for leave and was granted leave to comment on the three authorities cited by Chief Gani Fawehinmi.
It Is clear from the record that objection was not taken to the three counsel arguing against the motion to restrain them from the Bar. Even with this motion for interlocutory injunction before the Court, the three counsel argued the motion to "strike out the name of the 1st Defendant and strike out the action" from the Bar without objection.
After hearing arguments in the two applications, the learned trial Judge, Ademola Johnson, Chief Judge, adjourned the case to 19th July, 1985 for Ruling. On the 19th day of July, 1985, the learned Chief Judge, Candido Ademola Johnson delivered his ruling. He dismissed the 1st Defendant's application to strike out the name of the 1st Defendant from the suit and to strike out the action and granted the application of the plaintiff for injunction restraining Chief F. R. A. Williams, Mr. Kehinde Sofola and Mr. Molajo from further appearance for any of the parties.
In his ruling, the learned Chief Judge observed, commented and held, inter alia:
(1) "It is my considered view, having taken account of the implications of the different legislations recognising, imposing duties and granting privileges to the Association as a Body, that it is meant to give the Association even though unincorporated, a legal personality and I so hold. I therefore rule on that issue that the 1st Defendant is a juristic person and properly sued by the applicant as a Defendant in this suit.
The motion of the learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant praying the court to strike out the entire action is, in my considered view, mis-conceived and is accordingly dismissed."
(2) "I now proceed to the motion by the applicant to restrain three learned Senior Advocates representing the 1st Defendnt to wit:
Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N.
Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N.
Mr. Molajo, S.A.N.
from further representing the 1st Defendant by way of an interlocutory injunction
On the prevailing facts of the present situation and in the exercise therefore of the court's inherent jurisdiction and inspite of the mis-conceived basis upon which the applicant founded his motion the court is able and thus therefore modify the order prayed for from an interlocutory injunction to an order for an injunction simpliciter. The three learned Senior Advocates of Nigeria, Chief Williams, Mr. Kehinde Sofola and Mr. Molajo are therefore hereby restrained from further appearance for any of the parties in this case as at present constituted."
After the order of injunction was made, Chief Williams applied for the suspension of the operation of the order of injunction to enable counsel concerned to initiate and prosecute appeal against the Ruling of the court. The learned Chief Judge gave sympathetic consideration to the application and granted it saying:
It is conceded that the three learned Counsel are aggrieved persons in respect of the court's ruling restraining them from further appearance in this case for the 1st Defendant. I am of the consideration now that in the peculiar situation here, it would be put without derogation (sic) for the order of this court already made to grant permission to the aggrieved persons to take steps as required by law to initiate and pursue an appeal against the said ruling and no more. Permission is accordingly granted for appropriate steps to be taken in the proposed appeals."
The three learned Senior Advocates then took the necessary steps to initiate and prosecute appeals against the Ruling to the Court of Appeal.
Each of them filed a notice of appeal against the Ruling and the three of them, acting as legal practitioners representing the 1st Defendant, filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the 1st Defendant against the Ruling.
The appeals came up for hearing before the Court of Appeal (coram Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A . (as he then was), Kutigi and
Kolawole , JJ.C.A.) and after hearing submission of all the parties to the appeal, the Court adjourned for considered judgment. On the 13th day of March, 1986, the Court of Appeal delivered a well considered judgment allowing the appeal of the 4 appellants. The order of injunction was set aside. The Court held that the Nigerian Bar Association is not a juristic person and as such, cannot be sued legally in its name. It then struck out the action.
The plaintiff was not satisfied and hence he brought this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Before the appeal to the Court of Appeal was heard, the appearance of the three learned Senior Advocates as counsel for the Nigerian Bar Association was the subject of an objection. At page 378 of the record, Chief Gani Fawehinmi in his argument in support of his objection said:
There are two sets of appellants, namely:
(1) Nigerian Bar Association & Anor.
(2) Chief Williams, Mr. Sofola and Mr. Molajo. This 2nd set according to the drawn up order of 1985 contained at pp.200 and 201 were restrained by the Chief Judge of Lagos State on the 19th of July, 1985 from "further appearing for any of the parties in this case as at present constituted". They lodged an appeal against that order. The order subsists. There is no order staying the execution or effect of that order or in any manner restraining the effectuation of that order. I concede that they can appear for themselves. But they cannot appear for the Bar Association."
Chief Williams then replied and stated that on his application, the injunction was suspended to enable them initiate and prosecute the appeal against the ruling. He submitted further that even if the High Court did not make the order for a stay of the order of injunction, the Court of Appeal had power to make the order in the circumstances of the case. Chief Fawehinmi then made a categorical statement that "there was no suspension of the order" and that "suspension of the order was applied for but refused.
The Court of Appeal was obliged to Rule on the objection. NnaemekaAgu, J.C.A. (as he then was) (with whom Kutigi and Kolawole, JJ.C.A. concurred) in his Ruling said:
"So much water has gone under the bridge since the order was made. The 3 learned Senior Advocates of Nigeria have filed a notice of appeal for the appellants including the Nigerian Bar Association. They appeared on their behalf in a subsequent application before the Chief Judge. They have settled and signed their brief of argument. In the circumstances to now stop them from further appearance will unnecessarily delay the proceedings. It is my view that the ends of Justice will be met if then we make an order for stay of the 3 orders barring Chief Williams and Messrs. Molajo and Sofola from further appearing for the Nigerian Bar Association until the final determination of this appeal be stayed if an order to like effect was not made by the learned Chief Judge. I therefore order accordingly."
It is therefore crystal clear that during the course of proceedings in the two 'courts below, that is the Court of Appeal and the High Court, the exercise of t..~ be right of each of the 3 learned Senior Advocates as counsel to the Nigerian Bar Association was never restrained by the Court. The courts made full allowance for the exercise of that right.
From the analysis of the facts so far, the appellant instituted no action and ~ade no claim against the 3 learned Senior Advocates. It was only their repi~sentation as counsel for the Nigerian Bar Association that was objected to. 'There was therefore no concrete or real dispute known to law between the appellant and the 3 learned Senior Advocates. Moreover, the Court of Appeal in the lead judgment delivered by Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A. (as he then was) (concurred in by Kutigi and Kolawole, JJ.C.A.) said:
Chief Fawehinmi has strenuously urged on us that the role played by the three Senior Advocates is against the spirit of the Rules of Professional Conduct in the legal profession. But I am unable to find anything in these Rules that expressly prohibits a lawyer who appeared at the settlement of a case from appearing subsequently as counsel for one of the parties. On the contrary, section 24 of the High Court Law of Lagos State provides:
In any action in the High Court, the court may promote reconciliation among the parties thereto and encourage and facilitate amicable settlement thereof."'
The learned Justice continued further and said:
Above all, as I have pointed out their action is consistent: they have always opposed the boycott of the tribunals by lawyers but do not believe the issue should be settled by litigation. Having failed to get the case withdrawn from court, they now appear for the 1st appellant to move that the suit be struck out on a preliminary objection. I do not see anything inconsistent, dishonourable, or disgraceful or that falls below what is expected of the elders of the legal profession in their conduct
It does appear to me that all cases of professional misconduct have been decided either in the interest of justice such as where the court has been deceived or misled, or that of a party when he needs the protection of the court. In the former case, the court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction and act to stop or remedy the misconduct. In the latter case, it can act to restrain the act of misconduct at the instance of the party affected. In the instant case, the injunction as framed did not appear to have clearly distinguished between the two types of remedies
In my view, if there were proper grounds for the invocation of the inherent power of the court, I do not see anything wrong with the Respondent filing a motion if only to bring the circumstances for the exercise of the jurisdiction to the notice of the court, but there were none.
In the meantime, for all I have said before, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. As the real party is not a juristic person, I strike out the action. Further, and/or alternatively, I set aside the order of injunction against the 2nd, 3rd and 4th appellants.
The above narration concludes the facts relevant to the Reasons for the Ruling on the objection. The facts are heavily weighted against the appellant in his objection and led Chief F. R. A. Williams to formulate the questions or issues for determination the way he did in the brief filed on behalf of the Nigerian Bar Association and Mr. Kehinde Sofola. If when the High Court made an order of injunction, it suspended it to enable the 3 learned Senior Advocates provide legal representation and perform their professional duties on behalf of the Nigerian Bar Association, it seems incomprehensible that when the order of injunction has been discharged, the appellant should object to their representation and performance of their professional duties from the Bar.
I shall now proceed to examine the submissions in search of answers to the issues raised.
As stated in the appellant's brief, the only ground of objection is that:
"The appearances of Chief F. R. A. Williams, S.A.N. and Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. if allowed as announced on 8th November, 1988 will not be in accord with their professional role and duty to the court as "counsel" arguing a case before the highest court of the land and furthermore, the appearances will not be in the tradition or standard of the legal profession."
Reliance for the formal objection was placed on the case of Ajide V. Kelani
(1985)3 N.W.L.R. (Part 12) 248 at 257-258. This is to emphasise that although the objection was at first taken orally the objection and the ground of objection has been reduced in writing and notice thereof given in compliance with the Rules of Court Order 2 Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985.
The appellant in his brief submitted that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents are parties in this appeal and that they cannot act as counsel to themselves or to any other party in the appeal. Being parties, they are entitled to present their cases from the well of the court and not from the Bar fully robed. They are, however, entitled to retain counsel" outside their number to whom each of them will have to surrender the conduct of his case. He referred to paragraph 72 page 49 Vol.3 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition.
Chief Williams, S.A.N. and Mr. Kehinde Sofola, S.A.N. being parties, he claimed in his submission, could not claim the rights and privileges of a legal practitioner. They will be accorded fully those rights and privileges enjoyed by a member of the public. He then cited the case of Queen V. Phillips 1 Cox C.C. 17~and referred to paragraph 1117 at page 601 of Vol. of the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition. He submitted that a legal practitioner conducting his personal case in court must not be allowed to (a) sit at the Bar; (b) stand in the Bar; (c) speak from the Bar. He must go outside the Bar and remove his wig and gown before he can be heard by the court in the well of that court, he emphasised and contended.
He then cited the dictum of Edge, C.J. in the case of In the Matter of the West Hopetown Tea Company Ltd. 1887 Indian Law Report (Allhabad) Vol. 9 page 180 at page 181". He also cited the dictum of Wilde, C.J. in Newton V. Chaplin
(1850)19 Law Journal Common Pleas 374 at 376 in support. He then referred to the Practice Note reported in (1961)1 All E.R. - 319 made by Parker, C.J. - Salmon and Winn, JJ. in a criminal matter on the 17th day of January, 1961. He also referred to the confession of Mr. Neate in Neate V. Denman 43 L.J. Ch. 409 at 414 made in open court in 1974 that
If this had been simply a private case of my own, I should not have appeared in person and in my robes.
He then referred to the case of New Brunswick and Canada Railway Co. V. Conybeare 11 E.R. 907.1 have had a look at this case and find that at p.911, the following note occurs:
Mr. G. L. Russell, on the first day of the hearing, said that he appeared for Respondent and suggested that Mr. Conybere as his junior in the cause. He referred to Newton V.
Ricketts (9 H.L. Cas 262), where a party appeared as counsel at the bar of this House.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Westbury) - certainly But not both as party and counsel.