In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 29th day of July 1994
S.C. 147/1993
Between
N.A.B. Kotoye ....... Appellant
And
Mrs F.M. Saraki
Dr. Olusola Saraki ....... Respondents
Judgement of the Court
Delivered by
Idris Legbo Kutigi. J.S.C
In the consolidated suits Nos. LD/ 845/87 and
LD/938/87 the plaintiffs together and the 2nd plaintiff alone respectively claimed against the defendant as follows:-
"LD845/87
(1) A declaration that the 2,400,000 shares and the Bonus, Scripts and other shares attached thereto standing in the name of the defendant in the Register of Shareholders of Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited is held by him in trust for the plaintiffs (or alternatively) for the 2nd plaintiff;
(2) An order directing an Inquiry into the amount of any dividends which may have been received by the defendant as holder of the afore-mentioned shares up to the date of the judgment herein;
(3) An order of injunction restraining the defendant from holding or dealing with the aforesaid shares otherwise than as trustee for the plaintiff and in accordance with the lawful direction of the plaintiff or the appropriate authorities.
(4) An order for rectification of the Registrar of Shares to give effect to any judgment delivered herein."
"LD/938/87
1. A declaration that the 4,579,460 shares standing in the name of the defendant in the Register of Shareholders of Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited is held by him in trust for the plaintiff.
2. An order directing an inquiry into the amount of any dividends which may have been received by the defendant as holder of the aforementioned shares up to the date of the judgment herein.
3. An order of injunction restraining the defendant from holding or dealing with the aforesaid shares otherwise than as trustee for the plaintiff and in accordance with the lawful direction of the plaintiff or the appropriate authorities.
4. An order for rectification of the Register of Shares to give effect to any judgment delivered herein.
5. An order for the refund of the sum of
N 70.000.00 being balance of the N800,000.00 held by the defendant on the plaintiff's behalf.
The defendant counter-claimed against the plaintiffs in the consolidated suits thus-
"LD/845/87
(1) Whereupon the defendant by way of Counter-claim claims against the 2nd plaintiff the sum of
N 730,000.00 being money advanced to the 2nd plaintiff or to his order at his request.
(2) The defendant also claims interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum from the 15th day of May, 1986 until payment."
"LD/938/87
(1) A declaration that of the 6,876,840 shares standing in the name of the plaintiff in the Register of Members of Societe Generale Bank Nigeria Limited 2,783,483 thereof are not held by the plaintiff beneficially but upon trust for the plaintiff and the defendant for disposal as they shall both agree to deserving Nigerians of their choice.
(2) An injunction restraining the plaintiff from dealing with the said shares as if he were sole beneficial owner.
The hearing of the consolidated suits was still in progress when the defendant filed a Motion on Notice to strike out the suits on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to continue to entertain same and or allow the proceedings to be maintained. The motion was supported by a 4-paragraph affidavit sworn to by one Oluwole Koya, a legal practitioner in the Chambers of Ayanlaja, Adesanya & Co. who are counsel with Chief G. O. K. Ajayi, S.A.N. for the defendant/applicant. Paragraphs 2 & 3 of the affidavit merely recited plaintiffs' claims in suits Nos. LD/ 845/87 and LD/938/87 reproduced above. The remaining para. 4 which I consider vital to the motion reads:
"4. That it is common ground both in the pleadings filed and the evidence adduced so far before this Honourable court by both parties to the proceedings in the two consolidated cases aforesaid that, the shares in dispute are registered in the name of the defendant in the books of
Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited as holder thereof."
The motion was filed pursuant to the promulgation of-Banks and other Financial Institutions Decree
No.25 of 1991. The commencement date was 20th June 1991. Section 11 of the said Decree reads:
"11. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any contract or instrument, no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained against any person registered as the holder of a share in a bank on the ground that the title to the said shares vests in any person other than the registered holder.
Provided that nothing in this section shall bar a suit or other proceedings on behalf of a minor or person suffering/ram any mental illness on the ground that the registered holder holds the share on behalf of the minor or person suffering from the mental illness." (Italics are mine for emphasis only).
In a considered ruling delivered on the 27th day of November 1992 the F learned trial Judge dismissed the motion or application. On page 54 of the record he said:-
"It is not in dispute as far as the claims go that the titles to the shares held by the defendant in
S.G.B.N. vest in him. I do not find that Section 11 bars this suit or other proceeding based on the claims in the first four paragraphs of the consolidated suits from being maintained against the defendant. The question of whether or not there is a trust concerning the shares held in the-name of the defendant in S.G.B.N. is far from being determined and cannot be until the whole evidence is taken. The learned defence counsel had pointed out in his reply that the fifth claim in Suit LD/938/87 is unaffected in any way by this motion. This is a relief for refund of the balance of certain sum allegedly held by the defendant in the plaintiff's behalf therein. I agree with him."
Dissatisfied with the ruling above, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Lagos. He formulated eight issues for determination while the plaintiffs formulated only one as follows:
"Whether the jurisdiction of the court to continue the hearing of this action has been ousted by the provision of section 11 of the banking A and other Financial Institution Decree 1991 No.25."
The Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs when it said in its judgment on page 100 of the record that:-
"The issue before this court is the correct interpretation of section 11 of the Banking and other Financial institutions Decree No. 25 of 1991 and applying the said interpretation to the claims in this case so as to determine whether the court below has the jurisdiction to continue the case or not."
It then considered the issue and arrived at the conclusion that the High Court had jurisdiction to continue the consolidated suits and dismissed defendant's appeal with costs.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal the defendant has now appealed to the Supreme Court. Five issues were identified for determination in his brief. The plaintiffs on their part set out only one issue for determination in their brief. It reads:-
Whether the claims contained in the Statement of Claim in this action (or any of them) can strictly regarded, be described or categorised as a claim by the plaintiffs or either of them that the title D to the shares registered in the name of the defendant vests in them or either of them than in the said defendant.
I agree entirely. The issue above was the same issue before the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal even though worded differently. In fact we are to consider whether the claims of the plaintiffs are caught by the provision of section 11 of Decree 25 of 1991 which is reproduced here again:-
"11. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any contract or instrument, no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained against any person registered as the holder of a share in a bank on the ground that the title to the said shares vests in any person other than the registered holder.
Provided that nothing in this section shall bar a suit or other F proceedings on behalf of a minor or person suffering from any mental illness on the ground that the registered holder holds the share on behalf of the minor or person suffering from the mental illness."
The provisions can be conveniently broken down as follows:-
A. No suit or other proceedings shall be maintained
against a registered holder of shares in a bank on the ground that the title to the said shares vests in any person other than the registered holder.
B A suit or other proceedings on behalf of a minor or person suffering from any mental illness against a registered holder of shares in bank on the ground that the registered holder holds the share on behalf of the minor or person suffering from mental illness is maintainable. (See the proviso
above).
I must say at once that the opening clause that
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any contract or instrument"
ought to be restricted to a provision in any law or contract or instrument which allows a litigant to maintain the suit against a registered holder on the ground that the title in the shares vests in any other person other than the registered holder. We have not been referred to any law or contract or instrument which provides as such. I venture to say that the clause cannot be read to cover cases of trusts more so as the suit herein is not being maintained because there is a trust, rather it is because of lack of it.
It is a settled cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where, in their ordinary meaning the provisions are clear and unambiguous effect should be given to them without resorting to external aid. The duty of the court is to interpret the words of the statute as used. Those words may be ambiguous, but even if they are the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited (see for example
Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of 'the Federation (1981) 10S.C. 1; Abioyev.Yakubu
(1991)5 NWLR (Pt. 190) 130, Lawal v. G.B. Ollivant (1972) 2 S.C. 124, Aya v. Henshaw (1972) 5 S.C. 87;
There is no doubt at all that the plaintiffs do not come under my classification (B) above. They are neither minors nor persons suffering any mental illness. We are therefore left with classification (A) only. The task now will be to examine the plaintiffs' claims or reliefs one by one to see whether any of them is covered thereunder. It should be noted at once that the only ground for disqualification provided under (A) above and in fact under section 11 of Decree 25 of 1991 is "that the title to the said shares vests in any other person than the registered holder"
So that unless the plaintiffs specifically claim that title in the shares vests in them or in any person other than the defendant registered holder, it would be difficult to bring them under section 11 of the Decree. It is common ground as stated in para.4 of the affidavit in support of the motion above, that the shares in dispute are registered in the name of the defendant in the books of Societe Generale Bank Ltd as holder thereof. The consolidated suits in no way sought to challenge or deny that the defendant is the registered holder of the shares in question or that the shares are vested in him. I think therefore that Chief Williams S.A.N. was right when he said that the plaintiffs are not challenging the fact that the defendant is the registered owner of the shares, but that the defendant is a trustee of those shares for the plaintiff as the beneficial owners. That in my view is the plain and ordinary meaning of the plaintiffs claims in this case.I appreciate that there might be problems in respect of the claim for rectification depending on what turns out to be rectified after the trial. Definitely it could not be the rectification of the name of the defendant as a registered holder of the shares which section 11 (ibid) forbids, but it could even be the number of shares or any other error as may be revealed during the trial. But once the defendant is declared a trustee of any of the shares for the plaintiffs, the question of rectifying the Register of Shareholders to reflect their names would no more arise because defendant cannot be a trustee unless he holds the shares in his name to enable him exercise control over them.
There is no doubt at all that section 11 (ibid) sought to oust the jurisdiction of the court to entertain matters in respect of registered shareholders in banks. Therefore being an ouster clause, the provision will have to be construed strictly and very strictly too (see Barclays Bank v. C.B.N. (1976) 1 All
NLR 409. Ouster clauses must not be construed liberally, or loosely or wantonly. And that is what I have endeavoured to do in this case. We must not forget that a constructive trust, as in this case, is imposed by equity on the ground of conscience and it is not based on the prior or presumed intention of the parties. I would like to believe that the A parties herein are conscionable people. A constructive trust is a trust to be made out of the circumstances. The trial High Court was therefore right when it said:-
The question of whether or not there is a trust concerning the shares held in the name of the defendant in S.G.B.N. is far from being determined and cannot be until the whole evidence is taken.
The Court of Appeal was equally right when it held as per Ubaezonu J.C.A., who read the lead judgment, that:-
"The present suit does not challenge or deny that the appellant is the registered holder of the shares in question or that the shares are vested in him. No. What I understand him to be saying is:-
I concede that the shares are vested in you but, you hold it in trust for me."
I think that if as a result of the plaintiffs' claims, the defendant is successfully pronounced to be a trustee of any of the shares thereof, he the defendant will still remain the registered legal owner of the shares while the plaintiffs will become the beneficial owners only, a trust relationship being equitable generally. It is of no consequence whatsoever that the defendant though a registered holder is a mere notional or nominal owner of the shares while the plaintiffs are the real beneficial owners. That is exactly what the law of trust is all about. It is not the function of any court to change the law and Decree 25 of 1991 has not changed it. It is none of the business of the court to read into the section 11 other meanings simply because the court does not like the natural and direct result of its application which does not lead to any absurdity.
I must observe that this being an interlocutory application, I must avoid making any observation in the judgment which might appear to prejudge the main issues in the proceedings relative to the interlocutory application (see for example Egbe v.
Onogun ( 1972) 1 All NLR (Pt.l) 95; Ojukwu v. Governor of Lagos State (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.26) 39. It was therefore necessary for me to have restricted myself to the single issue identified by the plaintiffs and the lower courts for determination as above.
In conclusion this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. I hold that the two lower courts, the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal, were right when they respectively came to the conclusion that the High Court has the jurisdiction to continue with the consolidated suits herein. The plaintiffs are awarded costs assessed at one thousand (N 1,000) naira against the defendant.
Judgement
Delivered by
Abubakar Bashir Wali J.S.C
I have read in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother, Kutigi, J.S.C., and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal be dismissed, I however wish to make the following contributions:-
The plaintiffs:
(1) Mrs. F. M. Saraki; and
(2) Dr. Olusola Saraki
by their amended statement of claim in suit No. LD/845/87 claimed against the defendant, the following reliefs:-
(1) A declaration that the 2,400,000 shares and the Bonus Script and other shares attached thereto
standing in the name of the defendant in the Register of Shareholder of Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited is held by him in trust for the plaintiffs (or alternatively) for the 2nd plaintiff;
(2) An order directing an inquiry into the amount of any dividends which may have been received by the defendant as holder of the afore-mentioned shares up to the date of the judgment herein;
(3) An order of injunction restraining the defendant from holding or dealing with the aforesaid shares otherwise than as trustee for the plaintiff and in accordance with the lawful direction of the plaintiff or the appropriate authorities;
(4) An order for rectification of the Register of Shares to give effect to any judgment delivered herein."
The defendant, in his amended statement of defence counter-claimed as follows:-
"46. WHEREUPON the defendant by way of counter-claim claims against the 2nd plaintiff the sum of N730,000 being money advanced to the 2nd plaintiff or to his order at his request
47. The defendant also claims interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum from the 15th day of May, 1986 until payment."
Also on the Amended Statement of Claim to Suit
No.LD/938/87, Dr. Sola Saraki v. N.A.B. Kotoye, the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs against the defendant:-
"(1) A declaration that the 4,579,460 shares standing in the name of the defendant in the Register of Shareholders of Societe Generale Bank (Nigeria) Limited is held by him in trust for the plaintiff.
(2) An order directing an inquiry into the amount of any dividends which may have been received by the defendant as holder of the aforementioned shares up to the date of the judgment herein.
(3) An order of injunction restraining the defendant from holding or dealing with the aforesaid shares otherwise than as trustee for the plaintiff and in accordance with the lawful direction of the plaintiff F or the appropriate authorities.
(4) An order for rectification of the Register of Shares to give effect to any judgment delivered herein.
(5) An order for refund of the sum of N70,000.00 being balance of the
N 800,000.00 held by the defendant on the plaintiff's behalf."
The defendant on his part and in his Further Amended Statement of Defence claimed against the plaintiff as follows:-
"(i) A declaration that if the 6,876,840 shares standing in the name of the plaintiff in the Register of Members of Societe Generale Bank Nig. Limited, 2,783,483 therefore are not held by the plaintiff beneficially but upon trust for the plaintiff and the defendant for disposal as they shall both agree to deserving Nigerians of their choice.
(ii) An injunction restraining the plaintiff from dealing with the said shares as if he were sole beneficial owner."
The two suits were consolidated for hearing. While the hearing was in progress, the defendant, by a Motion on Notice dated 16th March 1992 applied to the trial court for an order:
Striking out the consolidated suits herein on the ground that this Honourable court has no jurisdiction to continue to entertain same and or allow the proceedings to be maintained against the defendant/ applicant."
The application was opposed. After hearing arguments from both parties. The learned trial Judge, OlusoJa Thomas J, delivered his Ruling on 27th November 1992 in which he opined thus:-
"Turning again to the provisions of section 11 of Decree 25/1991, one finds that the restriction of suit or other proceeding against a registered holder of a share in the bank as provided in the main part thereof is when one part challenges the registered holder that his "title to the said shares vests in any person other than himself". On the other hand, the proviso used different language when exempting the minor or person suffering from mental illness, that is, '"on the ground that the registered holder hold the shares on behalf of the minor or person suffering from mental illness
and then declared-
"I do not find that Section 11 bars this suit or other proceeding based on the claim in the first four paragraphs of the consolidated suits from being maintained against the defendant. The question of whether or not there is a trust concerning the shares held in the name of the defendant in S.G.B.N. is far from being determined and cannot be until the whole evidence is taken."
The defendant appealed against this Ruling to the Court of Appeal. And the Court of Appeal also after hearing the appeal opined thus before dismissing the said appeal:-
"The provision of section 11 of the Decree may be broken up as follows:
No suit or proceedings shall be maintained against
(i) A registered holder of shares in a Bank;
(ii) On the ground that the title of the shares so registered in his name vests in another person other than himself.
Thus, if any person brings an action in any court to say that title of the shares in a Bank registered in A's name does not vest in A but in B, the jurisdiction of the court is ousted from entertaining such an action. The registration of the shares of a Bank in the name of a person is absolute as to the person in whom the title to the said shares vests. The Decree is clear on this and gives no room for argument or speculation. The only issue in this case is whether A in whose name the shares are registered can hold the same in trust for a third party (B). The Decree is silent on this. In interpreting a statute, a court does not import into it what it does not say. The Decree talks of title or a person registered as holder. It does not talk about beneficial interest in the said shares or whether the person in whom the title vests can or cannot hold the shares in trust for another person."
The defendant has now further appealed to this court.
Both parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument as required by the Rules of Court. In the brief filed by the defendant now the appellant, five (5) issues out of the 6 grounds filed by him were identified for determination, while the plaintiffs now the respondents formulated only one issue for determination.
Since the main and determining issue in this appeal is the interpretation of section 11 of Decree No.25 of 1991, in my view the issue formulated by Chief Williams. SAN is the appropriate one for the purpose of determining whether the trial court has jurisdiction to continue with the hearing of the plaintiffs' case as formulated in the pleadings, and it reads thus:-
Whether the claims contained in the Statement of Claim in this action or (or any of them) can strictly be regarded, be described or categorized as a claim by the plaintiffs or either of them than title to the shares registered in the name of the defendant vests in them or either of them than the defendant."
Both learned Senior Advocates agreed that the materials to look, at in deciding this issue of jurisdiction are the Statement of Claim filed, and in the present case, the Amended Statement of Claim in suit LD/845/87, the Second Amended Statement of Claim in suit LD/938/87, and the defendants counter-claim in Amended Statement of Defence in suit LD/845/87 and the counter-claim in Further Amended Statement of Defence in suit LD/938/87. In this regard, both parties agreed that the shares in dispute are registered in the name of the defendant. But the plaintiff contended that this notwithstanding, section 11 did not bar the plaintiffs claim to the beneficial ownership of these shares.
Undoubtedly, looking at the averments contained in the pleadings of both parties, the issues of trust, trustee and beneficiary are very prominent and therefore in my view, Ubaezonu, J.C.A, was not totally wrong when he summarized the determinant issue in the appeal before them in his lead judgment as follows:-
"The only issue in this case is whether A in whose name the share are registered can hold the same in trust for B."
I do not think, having regard to the pleadings earlier referred to, one should quarrel so much with the way the learned trial Justice recast the germane and determining issue in this appeal.
Now section 11 of Decree No. 25 of 1991 provides thus:
"11. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any contract or instrument no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained against any person registered as the holder of a share in a bank on . the ground that the title to the said shares vests in any person other than the registered holder.
Provided that nothing in this section shall bar a suit or other proceedings on behalf of the minor or person suffering from mental illness."
In the course of hearing this appeal, this court suo
motu raised the question of retrospectivity of section 11 (supra), and while learned Senior Advocate for the defendant/ appellant submitted that it has retrospective application, learned Senior Advocate for the plaintiffs/respondents, did not make any submission on the issue. It is a well established principle of interpretation of statutes that where the provision of any law ousts the jurisdiction of court on any matter such a provision shall be narrowly and strictly construed, unless it clearly and unambiguously states so. See Dove v.Dove (1963) p.321, ( 1993) 2 WLR 714. In this case, the Court of Appeal while interpreting section 12(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 A which provided that if the spouse obtaining a decree Nisi of divorce did not make an application for it to be made absolute six months after the trial, then the other spouse could make application within a further period of three months, if the circumstances warranted, obtain a decree absolute, the Court of Appeal held that this did not oust the jurisdiction of the court to substitute a decree of judicial separation for a decree nisi,
because "had it been the intention of the legislature to revoke the jurisdiction , it would have been done in a clear way than by inference from the subjection." See also Commissioners of Customs & Excise v. Cure &Deeley,Ltd
(l962)Q.B.340, Barclays Bank v.C.B.N. (1976)1 All
NLR 409 at 421 and A.-G., Bendel State v. A.-G., Federation (1981)10 S.C. 1
This same principle was emphasised by VISCOUNT
Sumands in Smith v. East Elloe RD.C. (1956) A.C. 736 where he said at 750:-
"It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject recourse to Her Majesty's courts for determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words."
It shall also not be made to apply retrospectively to affect the acquired right before it or to affect litigations pending m court, unless such intention is manifestly and unambiguously made clear in it. See
Hickson v. Darlow ( 1883) 23 CH.D. 690 where it was held that the Bills of Sales Act (1878) (Amendment) Act, 1882 which made void bills of sale not registered within seven days of their execution, would not apply to instruments executed more than a week before the commencement of theAct. It was similarly held in RE BRANDONS PATENT(1884)9
APPCAS 589 that the provisions of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, would not affect any patents granted before its commencement.
See also the case of Moon v. Durden 2 Exh. 22 in which the majority judgment of that court (3 to 1) while interpreting 18th Section of Statute 8 and 9 Vie 109 which is worded thus:-
"And be it enacted that all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void, and that no suit shall be brought or maintained in any court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to -be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any person to decide the event on which any wager shall have been made."
held that the provision had no retrospective effect to affect suits commenced before its coming into operation.
In Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369 , the Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act, 1903 which had abolished a right of appeal by the Privy Council from the Supreme Court of Queensland, it was held not to apply retrospectively to a suit pending when the Act was passed and decided by the Supreme Court after that date.
In Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 547, Wright J opined thus:-"Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this, that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as A regards a matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment If the enactment is expressed in a language that is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only."
Looking at the wording of section 11,1 am of the view that it has neither retrospective effect, nor does it affect the issue of relationship of a trustor and a trustee and the beneficial interest accruing to the former from shares in a bank held and registered in the name of the latter for the benefit of the former. To hold otherwise is to import into the statute something that was not intended or contemplated by the legislature. The Decree only ousts the jurisdiction of the court from determining a dispute challenging the vesting of bank shares in the name of the person in whose name they are registered. The proviso to s.l 1 (supra) only provides exceptions to the main section in cases of persons of unsound mind or minors. The proviso in my view does not affect the question of trust or a claim of beneficial interest from such trust; and the case of Western Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society ( 1897)
A.C. 647 cited by learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents is apposite. In that case Lord
Herschell while dealing with the effect of proviso to the enactment said:-
"I decline to read into any enactment words which are not to be found there, and which would alter its operative effect because of provisions to be found in the proviso. Of course
^proviso may be used to guide you in the selection of one or other of two possible constructions of the words to be found in the enactment, and show when there is doubt about its scope, which it may reasonably admit of doubt as to its having this scope or that, which the proper view to take, but to find in it an enacting provision which enables something to be done which is not to be found in the enactment itself on any reasonable construction of it simply because otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless, would, as I have said, be in the highest degree dangerous,... and, accordingly, a F proviso is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular person was apprehensive, although the enactment was never intended to apply to his case, or to any other similar cases at all."
Commenting on the views (supra) Lord Davey opined thus:-
"My Lords, it seems to me that the whole argument of the appellants really comes to the old and apparently ineradicable fallacy of importing into an enactment, which is expressed in clear and apparently unambiguous language, something which is not contained in it, by what is called implication from the language of & proviso which may or may not have a meaning of its own. I entirely agree with what has fallen from my noble and learned friend opposite (Lord Herschell) upon this subject."
The style of Military Regimes legislations on ouster of courts jurisdiction has always been plainly and clearly drafted such that no iota of doubt is left as regards their intent, purport and scope. See for example, section 5(1) of Decree No.47 of 1979 and section 2(1) of Decree No. 48 of 1977.
I shall briefly touch upon the issue of fair hearing. I have gone through the briefs of argument filed by both parties in the Court of Appeal and I find myself convinced and satisfied that both parties were heard on the germane and determinant question of ouster of the