Igabele v S (SC 233/2004) [2006] NGSC 13 (16 February 2006)

(2006) 2 All N.L.R. 221

Onu, JSC (Delivered the Leading Judgment):- This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division sitting at Enugu, delivered on the 18 March 2004, wherein the Court of Appeal ("hereinafter referred to as the Court below") affirmed the conviction and sentence to death passed on the appellant as earlier pronounced by the trial court - the High Court, Enugu.

The relevant facts of this case may be succinctly stated as follows:-

The appellant was, on 7 February 1990, arraigned before the Enugu High Court on a charge of murder of one Gerald Chikezie Ozo Okeke pursuant to the provisions of section 319(1) Criminal Code Cap. 30 Vol. II Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963 applicable to Enugu State.

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution thereafter called nine witnesses in proof of its case, the summary of which was that the appellant, a professional motor driver was in the employ of PW3 ("Mr Orakwulu") while the deceased who was then living with PW3, as a motor conductor also in the latter's employ, were sent on a journey together by him.

That the appellant and the deceased, both employees of PW3, were the driver and conductor respectively of, lorry, Registration No. AN 8850B that on 13 January 1985, they travelled out in the said lorry but did not return on that day as usual? that rather, another driver in the employ of PW3 by the name of Patrick Mbang (PW4), drove back the lorry back on 17 January 1985 with PW4. That appellant informed PW4 that he ("appellant") would go to eat at a place near Spera in DEO Petrol Filling Station, Abakaliki and thereafter visit his brother in town on 18 January 1985, with nothing being heard about the deceased. This then led PW3 to lodge a report of the missing person at Abakaliki Police Station on 18 January 1985, subsequent to which the appellant was on 29 March 1985, arrested in his hometown Nimo.

PW2 ("Mrs Roseline Enckwechi") later saw the corpse of the deceased somewhere along Abakaliki - Ogoja Road and identified it to PW1 on 11 July 1985 before it was buried at Enugu Cemetery.

PW6 then described how he saw and removed a corpse lying at the River bank on 27 February 1985 at Abakpa Nike, which he buried the same day at Enugu Cemetery. A body was thereafter exhumed at the Enugu Cemetery on 11 July 1985 and the same was identified by PW2 ("mother of the deceased") to PW1 ("medical officer") who performed the post-mortem examination.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, the appellant made and relied solely on circumstantial evidence. The trial court, however, found the appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death by hanging. Wherefore, he ("appellant") appealed to the court below which in its considered judgment affirmed the judgment of the trial court in its entirety following which he appealed to this apex Court on two grounds of appeal as appearing in the Notice of Appeal at pages 183-184 of the Record of Appeal.

The lone issue formulated on behalf of the appellant for our consideration reads:-

(i) In view of the evidence as contained in the Record of Appeal, was the Court of Appeal justified in holding that the charge of murder against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt?

The lone issue submitted as arising on behalf of the respondent on the other hand goes thus:-

Whether the Court of Appeal was right in confirming the conviction of the appellant for murder having regard to the evidence before the court.

As there is hardly much to choose between the lone issue filed by either party to this case, I prefer the respondent's as being enough to dispose of this appeal which I duly adopt as follows:-

Argument

In arguing the lone issue, it is clear that the duty on the prosecution in a murder charge is to establish:-

(i) That the deceased died?

(ii) The act or omission of the accused which, caused the death of the deceased was unlawful? and

(iii) That act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased must have been intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.

See Alewo Abogede v State (1996) 5 NWLR (Part 448) 270, a case of murder whereupon the affirmation of his conviction and sentence to death by the Court of Appeal, the appellant contended, inter alia, whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant the confirmation of the conviction and sentence passed on him. It was held that the prosecution met the above legal requirements through credible evidence accepted by the courts. See also Edwin Ogba v State (1992) 2 NWLR (Part 222) 164 at 198C-D, where this Court held:-

"These three conditions must co-exist and where one of them is absent or tainted with doubt the charge is not said to be proved. The onus of proof is on the prosecution throughout and does not shift." (See also Obudo v State (1991) 6 NWLR (Part 198) 435 at 456).

Although the above case is a Court of Appeal decision, it so reiterates the principles exemplified in the case at hand that I hereby adopt it. That the above three legal requirements are neither absent nor tainted with doubt, has been settled by this Court in a number of cases particularly in Felix Nwosu v State (1986) 4 NWLR 348 at 359 per Eso, JSC who held, inter alia:-

"a judgment sending a man to the gallows must be seen to be the product of logical thinking based upon admissible evidence, which the facts leading to conviction are clearly found and the legal deductions there-from carefully made. It cannot be allowed to stand if founded upon scraggy reasoning or perfunctory performance. It is so in all cases and more so in criminal cases? and particularly in capital offences."

See also Daniels v The State (1991) 8 NWLR (Part 212) 713 at 732 where it was held that "the appellant is now a condemned prisoner and a charge of murder is established when the prosecution proves the following 'beyond reasonable doubt'":-

(a)    that the deceased has died?

(b)    that the death of the deceased has resulted from the act of the appellant? and

(c)    that act of the appellant was intentional with the knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequences.

See Ogba v The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Part 222) 164 at 198C-D where the Court of Appeal reiterated the law thus:-

"These three conditions must co-exist and where one of them is absent or tainted with doubt the charge is not said to be proved. The onus of proof is on the prosecution throughout and does not shift." (See Obudo v The State (1991) 6 NWLR (Part 198) 435 at 456). (Underlining mine.)

From the foregoing background, I shall now proceed to ascertain how the prosecution has striven to prove the three ingredients of the charge of murder leading to the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant his conviction and sentence to death:-

(A)    That the deceased died.

From the trial court record there is no evidence that the deceased was seen alive since he left PW3's house on 13 January 1985? hence there is a strong presumption that he was dead:

Be that as it may, PW1 endeavoured to clarify whether the body exhumed on 17 July 1985 (an interval of six months) from the Enugu Cemetery and post-mortem examination performed on it by him (PW1) after it had been identified to him by PW2, was the body of the deceased Chikezie Ozo Okeke or the body of another person. He (PW1) stated at page 32 from line 19 to 28-30 of the Record as follows:-

"From the state of decomposition it seems that many events had supervened between the date of death and that of the post-mortem examination."

At page 33, lines 5-9 of the record PW1 stated in his report as follows:-(i) "I found that certain of the sub-tissues were not easily identifiable"?

(ii) "The body was hardly recognisable, going by the physiognomy"?

(iii) "I am definite that a person falling from a height of a moving 911 lorry will sustain fracture - injury."

From the foregoing, I agree with the submission of the prosecution that it met the legal requirements of proof of murder through credible evidence acceptable by the courts as proof beyond reasonable doubt.

On the corpse identified by PW2 (Mrs Roseline Enckwechi) to PW1 on 11 July 1985, the submission for the defence was that the body identified to PW1 by PW2 and the one found along Ogoja/Abakaliki Road were different corpses. This, in my view, is very erroneous as PW2 being the mother of the deceased should be in no doubt as to the physical features and external morphology of her son. After all, she gave a vivid description of the dress her son was used to wearing and which he actually wore during the ill-fated trip proximate to the time of his death. The deceased also had a broken upper tooth from his childhood following a fall. Under cross-examination she stated poignantly "the face was not easily recognisable in his state of decomposition but I easily recognised the body with aid of that broken upper tooth and the dress he wore. The deceased also had tribal marks at the cheeks. The tribal marks were still on the cheeks when I saw the corpse." See page 34, line 19-23 of the record.

The evidence of PW2 was corroborated in this regard by the testimony of PW3, the master to the deceased who in his evidence-in-chief stated, inter alia, thus:-

"Upon examination I recognised the body as that of my conductor late Ozo Okeke. I recognised the corpse from the dress which the deceased wore on the day he left home last 13 January 1985. The deceased lived with me and he had left with the accused on 13 January 1985 wearing gins (sic) and black flowing shirt or polo. I also recognised the body from the mark on the deceased's check? he also had a broken tooth."

Under cross-examination PW3 had restated his position when he said:-

"I deny the suggestion that the body exhumed was not that of my late conductor Gerald Ozo Chikezie Okeke. It was the body and I recognised it very well."

From the foregoing facts and circumstances there could be no doubt that the autopsy was performed on the body of Ozo Okeke. (See Ndike v The State (1994) 9 SCNJ 46 at 50).

In this respect, I am left in no doubt that there could be any better identification than that made by PW2 and PW3. Consequently, I hold that the Court below was therefore, right in affirming the identification as valid and proper in the circumstance. It is therefore, in my view, of no moment whether PW2 saw the same corpse or another along Abakaliki - Ogoja Road with or without PW3. Seeing the same or another corpse by PW2 would appear rather speculative and a mere inaccuracy which goes to no issue.

This Court has decided that it is trite law that the court should not speculate on evidence but decide on the evidence presented before it. (See Okoko v State (1964) 1 All NLR 423 at 428). The court is only entitled to rely on the evidence before it and not on speculations. (See Seismograph Service (Nigeria) Ltd v Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC at 101).

The apparent conflict in the testimony of PW2 and PW3 as to whether they jointly embarked on the search for and or saw any other corpse along Abakaliki/Ogoja Road does not affect the justice of the case. PW3 was very emphatic that he did not see any other corpse while PW2 asserted she saw one along the road with PW3. That was a mere inaccuracy in the narration of the event as to how the search for the deceased was conducted by the two interested persons. I therefore, hold that whether or not PW2 saw the same or another corpse on the road, cannot derogate from the proven or established fact that the exhumed and properly identified corpse to the PW1 was that of the deceased and none other.

The minor inaccuracy by PW2 in her momentary confused situation while testifying was in my view of no moment as it does not go to the root of the charge of murder. See Ehot v State (1993) 5 SCNJ 65 at 80 where this Court held that minor inaccuracies and discrepancies that do not touch the justice or substance of a case should not be sufficient ground to disturb a judgment. Both the trial court and the court below felt that the suggestion of a different corpse from the one exhumed was so irrelevant and inconsequential, hence they glossed over same. I therefore, have no option but to uphold both convictions of the two courts below - their decisions being those on concurrent findings of facts - devoid of any contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Indeed for any conflict or contradiction to be fatal to the prosecution's case, it must be substantial and fundamental to the main issue. (See Ndike v State (supra) at 54 per Ogwuegbu, JSC, Onubogu v State (1974) 9 SC 1 at 20 and Okeke v State (1995) 4 NWLR (Part 392) 676 at 703).

In the Ndike case, the complaint was that whilst PW1 testified that he met the deceased lying on the ground already dead, other prosecution witnesses stated that the deceased was taken to the hospital. The doctor in that case (PW2) who admitted the deceased, later performed an autopsy without any further formal identification of the corpse.

The court overlooked the inconsistencies and held that formal admission of the deceased by the doctor in the presence of witnesses amounted to sufficient identification of the deceased. (See Ndike's case (supra) at pages 54-56).

In the case at hand, the appellant consistently attacked his conviction for murder on the ground that there was no eyewitness to the event leading to the murder of the deceased. I hold that it is not a condition or legal imperative that there must be an eyewitness before a murder charge could be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of the commission of the offence may proceed on circumstantial evidence. (See Ilori & another v State (1980) 8-11 SC 81).

And as I had occasion to show in Emeka v The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Part 734) 666 at 683, the guilt of an accused may be proved by (a) confessional statement, (b) circumstantial evidence or (c) evidence of eyewitnesses.

On the further attack that the conviction was based on the fact that the appellant could not give a satisfactory explanation of the whereabouts of the deceased, I hold the view that the decision by the trial court and its subsequent affirmation by the court below was proper. This Court went on to hold in Emeka v The State (supra) that "where the accused person was the last person to be seen in the deceased's company and circumstantial evidence is not only overwhelming but leads to no other conclusion, it leaves no room for acquittal. In the instant case the courts below were, in my view, right in relying on findings of fact that the appellant was guilty as charged." (See Obosi v State (1965) NMLR 140). Indeed, whereas in the instant case evidence points irresistibly to the guilt of the accused, it can ground a conviction. (See Ukorah v State (1977) 4 SC 167? Daniel v State (supra)). In his evidence in chief PW3 testified, inter alia, "on the said 13 January 1985, the accused took the lorry and departed my premises for the day's run of business. He left with the aforesaid Ozo Okeke Chikezie, who served as conductor on the lorry AN 8850 B? incidentally the accused unlike on other occasions, did not run (sic) that day 13 January 1985. The said Ozo Chikezie Okeke did not return either." (Underlining mine.) See page 37, lines 25-30 of the Record.

The deceased therefore, left with the appellant but was never seen alive again until his body was exhumed at the cemetery in a state of decomposition or mutilation. There is no other rational conclusion one could arrive at other than that the appellant murdered him. The possibility of a fall from the moving lorry having been discounted or falsified by medical evidence proof of innocence no longer avails the appellant as a defence or cover.

Moreover, it was the defence that conjured or elicited the fact of ritual murder from the PW9 under cross-examination. That same defence was at liberty to probe further details to disprove the ritual murder. PW1 testified as to the cause of death thus:-

"And in my opinion, the cause of death was due to shock from vital organs of the body. The organs were the tongue and the external genital organs."

The deduction that the deceased was a victim of ritual murder is therefore, supported by evidence. In this wise, I agree with the prosecution that the police officer ("IPO") who testified as PW9 whose evidence was earlier referred to by me in this judgment, was not bound to disclose his source of information. See the purport of section 166 of the Evidence Act which states that "No magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence."

In conclusion, I hold that this appeal ought to fail as unmeritorious and it stands dismissed because:-

(i) A prima facie case of murder was established against the appellant as all the ingredients of murder had been proven? the cause of death had been established through circumstantial evidence. (See Uguru v State (2002) 4 SCNJ 282 at 293).

(ii) The appellant was last seen alive with the deceased and as the identification of the deceased was proper, his conviction ought therefore, to be upheld vide Emeka v The State (supra) especially ratio 3.

(iii) Concurrent findings of the two courts below should be respected and affirmed since being a judgment supported by evidence and also not being perverse had not occasioned any miscarriage of justice. It therefore ought to be upheld. (See Osayeme v State (1966) NMLR 399 and Sanyaolu v State (1976) 6 SC 37).

(iv) Besides, proof beyond reasonable doubt as has been shown in this case, is not synonymous with proof beyond any shadow of doubt but ought to be proof beyond reasonable doubt and it is accordingly upheld by me. (See Oteki v Attorney-General of Bendel State (1986) 2 NWLR (Part 24) 648).

I accordingly dismiss this appeal and affirm the decisions of the two courts below.

Katsina-Alu, JSC:- I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Onu, JSC. I entirely agree with it.

This appeal clearly lacks merit. The appellant's conviction has been criticised on the ground that the body exhumed on 11 July 1985 from the Enugu Cemetery and examined by PW1 (Dr Anyatagu) and identified by PW2 (Roseline Enckwechi) was not the body of the deceased Chikezie Ozo Okeke.

I think there is no ground for this criticism. PW2 is the mother of the deceased. She gave evidence and said, inter alia:-

"I was able to identify the corpse from the following factors-

(i) He had a broken upper tooth from childhood following a fall?

(ii) the gins (sic) and polo he wore when leaving home last. I identified the corpse of the deceased to PW1? the medical doctor."

PW2 added under cross-examination that:-

"The deceased also had tribal marks at the cheeks. The tribal marks were still on the cheeks when I saw the corpse."

The evidence above was given by PW2, the mother of the deceased, who identified her deceased son to PW1 (Dr Anyatagu). Nobody, it would seem, was in any doubt that the body that was examined by PW1 was that of Chikezie Ozo Okeke. Thus the prosecution had shown clearly that Chikezie Ozo Okeke was dead.

No doubt the evidence against the appellant was circumstantial evidence. There was no direct evidence. However, there is evidence that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant. This was not in dispute. I think good sense and indeed common sense demands that the appellant should and must put forward some explanation as to what happened to the deceased. But no explanation was forthcoming. In fact the appellant called no evidence in his defence but rather rested his case on the case of the prosecution. The only irresistible inference from the circumstances presented by this evidence is that the appellant killed the deceased. See Peter Igho v The State (1978) 3 SC 87? where the deceased, as in this case, was last seen with the appellant. The Supreme Court held at page 90 as follows:-

"We can find no other reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case. The facts which were accepted by the learned trial Judge, amply supported by the evidence before him, called for an explanation, and beyond the untrue denials of the appellant, none was forthcoming. Though this constitutes circumstantial evidence, it is proof beyond any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant."

(See also Udo v The State (1981) 11-12 SC 91).

This appeal clearly lacks merit. I also dismiss it.

Oguntade, JSC:- On 7 February 1990, the appellant was arraigned upon information before the High Court sitting at the Enugu High Court of Enugu State. The charge brought against the appellant reads:-

"That you Godwin Igabele, 'M' on the 16 January 1985 along Enugu/Agbani Road in Enugu Magisterial district murdered one Chikezie-Ozo Okeke 'M' and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 319(1) of the Criminal Code Cap.30 Vol. 11, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963."

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was heard by Achi-Kanu, J. The prosecution called nine witnesses in all. The appellant's Counsel made a no-case submission on his behalf and thereafter rested his case on the prosecution's. In other words, the appellant elected not to call any evidence. On 9 May 1991, the trial Judge in his judgment found the appellant guilty as charged? and sentenced him to death. Dissatisfied the appellant brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division (hereinafter called the "court below"). The court below on 18 March 2004 dismissed the appellant's appeal and affirmed the sentence of death imposed on him by the trial Judge. The appellant has come before this Court on a final appeal. In the appellant's brief filed, the issue for determination in the appeal was identified as the following:-

"In view of the evidence as contained in the Record of Appeal, was the Court of Appeal justified in holding that the charge of murder against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt."

As the above solitary issue conveys, the appellant is contending before us that upon the evidence available against him, the court below ought not to have confirmed the verdict of the court of trial which found him guilty on the offence of murder. What then was the evidence against the appellant? Before I examine the evidence called, it is important to observe here that as against the evidence by the prosecution the appellant did not call any evidence. The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution are these:-

The appellant worked under PW3 as a motor driver. PW3 owned a vehicle No. AN 8850B. It was a commercial vehicle. The deceased Gerald Chikezie Ozo Okeke was PW3's conductor attached to the vehicle. He worked with the appellant under the employment of PW3. As they did on a daily routine, the appellant and the deceased on 13 January 1985 went out together in PW3's vehicle on their run. They were expected back at the home of PW3 on the evening of the same day at the end of the day's run. They did not return. Rather on 17 January 1985, PW4, another driver working for PW3 drove the vehicle to the house of PW3. He told PW3 that he saw the appellant at a Petrol Filling Station called SPERA IN DEO at Abakaliki. The appellant was seen alone by PW4. He told PW4 to help him drive the vehicle home as he wanted to eat at a place near the Filling Station and that he would later visit his brother in Abakaliki. PW3 was worried. On 18 January 1985, he lodged a report with the Police at Abakaliki. The appellant was at large until 29 March 1985 when he was arrested in his hometown, Nimo.

The corpse of the deceased was later discovered at a river bank in Abakpa Nike on 27 February 1985. The body was buried the same day. For the purpose of post-mortem examination, the body was exhumed on 11 July 1985. PW1 performed post-mortem examination. The result of the examination was stated in the judgment of the court of trial thus at pages 81-82 of the judgment:-

"(a) The body was completely decomposed?

(b)    There were no fractures, either of the skull-bone, the long-bones of the limbs (upper and lower)? or (of) the ribs?

(c)    The tongue and the external genital organs were not seen?

(d)    Also not seen, were other sub-tissues of the body?

(e)    The absence of the tongue and external genital organs and the sub-tissues could be attributed to the advanced stage of decomposition of the corpse? or to some other factor?

(f )    Police reference suggested 16 January 1985 as the probable date of death? and PW1 stated that -'If deceased died as a result of a fall from a moving 911 Mercedes Benz Lorry, he would be expected to suffer the fracture of some part of the body? more particularly the skull-bones which are very vulnerable to fracture'."

PW1 gave the cause of death as due to shock from the loss of vital organs of the body. The organs were the tongue and external genital organs.

When arrested, the appellant was asked the whereabouts of the deceased. The appellant said that the deceased disembarked from the vehicle somewhere on the explanation that he wanted to see his brother. The appellant did not say exactly where the deceased disembarked. Later the appellant changed his story. He stated that the deceased fell off the vehicle somewhere and died.

The appellant's Counsel has in his written brief submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. He relied on Nwosu v The State (1986) 4 NWLR (Part 35) 348 at 359? Daniels v The State (1991) 8 NWLR (Part 212) 713 at 732? Akin v The State (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 85) 72 at 74. Respondent's Counsel on the other hand submitted that as the appellant was the last person to have seen the deceased alive and as he failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to the whereabout of the deceased, the appellant was rightly found guilty. Counsel relied on Emeka v The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Part 734) 666 at 683 and Obosi v State (1965) NMLR 140? Uguru v State (2002) 4 SCNJ 282 at 293.

In this judgment, it is necessary to emphasise that there was no eye witness account as to how the deceased was killed. The evidence against the appellant was mainly circumstantial. It consists of the fact that the appellant and the deceased with whom he worked under PW3 left the house of PW3 together on 13 January 1985. They were expected back in the house of PW3 on the same day at the close of the day's run. The appellant did not show up on the said 13 January 1985. He was not seen again until he was arrested by the police on 29 March 1985. He gave conflicting accounts as to what had happened to the deceased. The first version was that the deceased had excused himself to visit his brother. The second was that the deceased fell off the vehicle and died. He was, however, not able to show anybody the point or place where the deceased fell and died. At a stage the appellant said that PW7 witnessed the accident. PW7 however denied this. Now, what did all these strange stories by the appellant amount to?

In Lori v State (1980) 8-11 SC 81 at pages 86-87, this Court per Nnamani, JSC said:-

"It is conceded that circumstantial evidence is very often the best evidence. It is said to be evidence of surrounding circumstances which by undersigned coincidence is capable of proving a proposition with the accuracy of mathematics. It is no derogation of evidence to say that it is circumstantial. R v Taylor & 2 others 21 Cr App R 20. See also Rex v Chung Yi Miao [1928] Shotland Re. Cited in Wills on Circumstantial Evidence (7ed) (1936) page 324 per Humphreys, J. But the circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal trial, especially murder, must be cogent, complete and unequivocal. It must be compelling and must lead to the irresistible conclusion that the prisoner and no one else is the murderer. The facts must be incompatible with innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt." (Underlining mine.)

It is compelling to ask myself the questions - Are the facts of this case compatible with the innocence of the appellant? Are the facts capable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the appellant? Now in Alonge v Inspector-General of Police (1959) 4 FSC, Ademola, CJF discussing the nature of the burden of proof on the prosecution in a criminal case said:-

"Now, the commission of a crime by a party must be proved beyond reasonable doubts. The burden of proving that any person is guilty of a crime rests on the person who asserts it and this is the law as laid down in section 137 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 62. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it never shifts? and if on the whole evidence the court is left in a state of doubt, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the onus of proof which the law lays upon it and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. But this does not mean, as argued before us, that the prosecution must call every available piece of evidence to prove its case? it is enough if sufficient evidence is called to discharge the onus which the law lays upon the prosecution."

On the facts of this case, whatever had happened to the deceased was within the peculiar knowledge of the appellant. The appellant had to explain how the deceased, a healthy young man who had left the house of PW3 with him on 13 January 1985 came to be found dead on 27 February 1985 with his tongue and genital organs missing from his body. It seems to me in consonance with common sense that the appellant in this circumstance ought to be called upon to offer a minimum of explanation on the matter. (See Okoko & another v The State (1964) 1 All NLR 423).

A case, Peter Igho v The State (1978) 3 SC 61 (Reprint) deserves special mention here. In that case, the deceased Ifoto Oboluke had