In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 8th day of June 2007
S.C. 208/2006
Between
Alhaji Mujahid
Dokubo-Asari ...... Appellant
And
Federal Republic of Nigeria ....... Respondent
Judgement of the Court
Delivered by
Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad. J.S.C
From the facts contained in the printed Record of appeal placed before this court, the appellant
Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari was a one time leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDSF) but now leader, Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF). He is also a member, Pro-National Conference Organisation. He, along with one Mr. Uche Okwukwu and others, now at large, were said to have signed one communiqué which castigated Governors, Local- Government Chairmen and NDDC Directors in connivance with the Federal Government that they looted the oil revenue accruing to the people of Niger Delta while pursuing their personal projects and
aggrandizement. This, they felt, had left the people in a state of neglect and abject poverty. They also cited the recent hike in fuel pump price as one of their grievances. They therefore threatened to take-up arms against the government after lodging their protest with Pro-National Conference Organisation (PRONACO). The Association also revealed its plan to cause civil disorder that would lead to the overthrow of the present Government. Dokubo Asari was arrested by the Police and taken to court on a five count charge of conspiracy; treasonable felony; forming, managing and assisting in managing an unlawful society; publishing of false statement and being a member of an unlawful society. These are offences created by and punishable under the Criminal Code Act, Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
On the 6th day of October, 2005 the appellant as accused, was arraigned before the Federal High Court Holden in Abuja. The appellant pleaded not guilty to all the 5 counts.
On the same 6th day of October, appellant's Counsel moved his summons on Notice dated 10th day of October, 2005, praying the trial court to admit the accused/appellant to bail. After taking arguments from the learned counsel for the respective parties, the learned trial Judge examined their submissions along with the affidavit evidence laid before him. In a considered ruling delivered on the 11th day of November, 2005, the learned trial Judge refused to grant bail to the accused/appellant.
Accused/Appellant was dissatisfied with the trial courts decision and he filed his Notice and Grounds of Appeal to the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division. (Court below). In its judgment of 6th June, 2006, the court below dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Further dissatisfied, the accused/appellant sought and was granted leave by the court below to appeal to this court. Two Grounds of Appeal were set out in the Notice of Appeal which was filed within the time granted by the court below for filing same.
Learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Keyamo, filed on behalf of the appellant a brief of argument in which he distilled two issues for the determination of the appeal by this court. These are the issues:-
"(i) Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it reached a conclusion of fact that there was acceptable evidence of threat to national security by the appellant in the case put forward by the respondent.
(ii) Assuming (without conceding) that the case of the respondent revealed a strong prima facie case of threat to national security, whether that suspends the right to bail as enshrined in section 35 of the 1999 Constitution ."
Learned Director of Public Prosecution of the Federation, who appeared for the respondent, filed the respondent's brief of argument. The learned DPP, Mr. Aliyu, formulated one issue for determination of the appeal by the court. The issue reads:-
"Whether in view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case and the evidence properly before the trial court, the court below was right when it confirmed the decision of the trial court.
In his submissions on issue 1, learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the concurrent findings of fact of both courts below as to threat to National Security cannot stand in the face of available evidence. He stated further that what is called "threat to National Security" can only be distilled from paragraphs 5(d) of the respondent's counter-affidavit at the trial court. These, he argued further, were just depositions without anything more to support them when the burden is on the prosecution to prove why bail should not be granted. Bail pending trial, learned Counsel submitted, is a Constitutional right and there is a presumption of innocence of the individual. He cited and relied on the cases of Enebeli .v. Chief of Naval Staff (2000) 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 671) 119 at 124-125;
Ani v. State (2002) 1N.W.L.R. (Pt. 747) 217 at 230. Learned Counsel stressed the point that it was not the duty of the Court of Appeal to believe or not to believe anything at this stage of the proceedings when exhibits have not been tendered at the trial. It was a grave error for that court to prejudice the appellant by believing that he actually granted an interview contained in a newspaper cutting which was part of a bundle of papers given to the appellant's Counsel (but not filed along with the charge, purportedly as proof of evidence. Learned Counsel urged this court to interfere with the finding of fact of the court as it violated the known principle of law that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. He urged this court to resolve issue No 1 in favour of the appellant.
In his submissions on issue No. 2, the learned Counsel for the appellant stated that a mere allegation of threat to National Security cannot automatically suspend the provisions of Chapter 4 of the 1999 Constitution which includes section 35 thereof, on right to bail. In disagreeing with the Court of Appeal in it's reasoning process, learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the only time human rights can take a second place is not when a mere charge relating to threat to National Security is brought against anyone, but when a formal declaration of a State of Emergency is proclaimed in line with the provision of the Constitution. It was argued further for the appellant that if "threat to National Security" is to be taken as a factor to consider in the grant or refusal of bail, the court must still have recourse to the competing depositions in the affidavit as filed by both parties and see whether the prosecution has successfully discharged this burden to show that there is a threat to National Security. Even if it is, it does not preclude altogether the consideration of that right to bail as enshrined in the Constitution. Learned Counsel referred to the case of Abiola v Federal Republic of Nigeria (1995) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 370).155 . He urged this court to resolve issue No. 2 in favour of the appellant. Learned Counsel finally urged us to allow the appeal and admit the appellant to bail.
The learned Director of Public Prosecution for the respondent submitted that the trial court took into consideration all the relevant criteria for the grant of bail as have been laid down in a plethora of cases and the court rightly held that all the requisite conditions for the grant of bail did not co-exist. He cited and relied on the cases of Anajemba v. Federal Government of Nigeria (2005) 1 N.C.C. 390 at page 3981; Ani v State (2002) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt 747) 217 at page 230 A-C; Nakutama Likita v. C. O. P, (2002) 11 N.W.L.R. (Pt 777) 145 at page 160 E-H; 161 - B. It was his further submission that there is a strong probability of guilt of the accused and that there is a likelihood of the accused person interfering with the cause of justice if released on bail. He relied on the affidavit evidence as well as the interim Police Investigation Report; the accused person's confessional statement; Communiqué of meeting held at Samsy Hotel,
Benin City, Edo State and the press interview. Learned Director of Public Prosecution cited the case of Bamaiyi v. State (2001) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt.715) 270 at 291. It was the learned Director of Public Prosecution's submission that refusing bail to the appellant is not in anyway inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The learned Director of Public Prosecution drew this court's attention to the fact that there are concurrent findings of the two lower courts against the appellant which were adequately supported by credible affidavit evidence adduced before the trial Court. The attitude of this court, he argued further, to such concurrent findings is that this court will not disturb such findings without any substantial error apparent on the record of proceedings or that such findings are perverse. He stated that the onus is on the appellant to demonstrate by showing the existence of special circumstances to justify why this court should interfere with the findings of fact made by the two lower courts. This, the appellant has woefully failed to do.
Further submission made on behalf of the respondent are that where an offence carries a sentence exceeding 3 years imprisonment, bail in such a case is not a mere matter of course, but rather, at the discretion of the court which must be exercised judicially and judiciously as has been done in this case. The learned Director of Public Prosecution cited section 118(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) . The charges against the appellant carry a. maximum sentence of life imprisonment. It is in the interest of justice to refuse the appellant bail and uphold the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. The learned Director of Public Prosecution urged this court to dismiss the appeal.
When it comes to the issue of whether to grant or refuse bail pending trial of an accused by the trial court, the law has set out some criteria which the trial court shall consider in the exercise of its judicial discretion to arrive at a decision. These criteria have been well articulated in several decisions of this court. Such criteria include, among others, the following:
(i) the nature of the charge;
(ii) the strength of the evidence which supports the charge;
(iii) the gravity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) the previous criminal record of the accused if any;
(v) the probability that the accused may not surrender Himself for trial;
(vi) the likelihood of the accused interfering with witnesses or may suppress any evidence that may incriminate him.
(vii) the likelihood of further charge being brought against the accused;
(viii) the probability of guilt;
(ix) detention for the protection of the accused.
(x) the necessity to procure medical or social report pending final disposal of the case.
See: Bamaiyi v. State (2001) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 761) 670; Abacha v. State (2002) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 761) 638; Ani v. State (2002) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 747) 217;
Ekwenugo v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2001) 6HW.L.R. (Pt 708) 9; Evu v. State (1988) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 78) 607.
These criteria are not exhaustive. Other factors not mentioned may be relevant to the determination of grant or refusal of bail to an accused. They provide the required guideline to a trial court in the exercise of its discretion on matters of bail pending trial. My learned brother, Uwaifo, JSC, had this to say on these factors:-
"In that regard it is proper to consider the nature of the offence, the nature of the evidence in support of it, and the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail. The learned trial Judge took this crucial factor as to availability to stand trial into consideration. These are not matters that should be glossed over. Some of them may not be admissible as evidence in the main trial but they are certainly worthy to be taken into account in an application for bail pending trial."
See the case of Bamaiyi v. State (Supra).
In his contribution in the above case, Ogwuegbu
JSC, stated:-
"That court has in most cases, discretion to admit an accused person to bail pending trial, but in the exercise of the discretion, the nature of the charge, the evidence by which it is supported, the sentence which by law may be passed in the event of conviction, the probability that the appellant will appear to take his trial, are the most important ingredients for the guidance of the court and where these are weighty, an appellate court will not interfere. See: In the matter of Etienne
Barronent and Edmond Allian I. E. and B. I. (1852) Dears 51; 118 E.R. K.B. 337 and Re Robinson (1854) 23 LJ. Q.B. 286."
As the appellant is facing criminal charges at the trial court it is very pertinent for me at this juncture for clarity sake, to set out in full the counts for which the appellant-is standing trial. They read as follows:-
"Charge
Count 1
That you: (i) Alhaji MujahidDokubo Asari 'm' 41 years old of No . 13 Agudama Street, D-Line, Port Harcourt; and others (presently at large) on or about 28th August, 2005 at
Samsy Hotel, Benin City, Edo State within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court did conspire among yourselves to commit felony to wit: treasonable felony; by forming an intention to:-
(a) Remove during his term of office otherwise than by constitutional means, President Olusegun Obasanjo as Head of State of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces thereof: and
(b) Levy war in order by force, constraint, to compel the President to
change his measures, counsel and manifested such intention by overt acts; and you thereby committed an offence contrary to section 41 and punishable under section 516 of the Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77,Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
Count 2
That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari (m), 41 years old of No. 13 Agudama Street, D-Line, Port Harcourt, and others (presently at large) on or about 28th August, 2005 at Samsy Hotel, Benin City, Edo State within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court did commit treasonable felony against the Federal Republic of Nigeria by respectively belonging to Militant Groups known as the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF); Congress For the Liberation of Ikwere People (COLIP) and Chikoko Movement which threatened to take up arms in order to intimidate and overawe the President and Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and manifested such intention by overt acts and you thereby committed a felony contrary to and punishable under S. 41 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 77 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
Count 3
That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari (m) 41 years old of No. 13 Agudama Street, D-Line, Port Harcourt; and others (presently at large) on or about 28th August, 2005 at
Samsy Hotel, Benin City, Edo State within the jurisdiction of the Federation High Court formed, managed and assisted in the management of unlawful societies of more than ten persons respectively known and called "Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force" (NDPVF), Congress For the liberation of Ikwere People (COLIP) and
Chikoko Movement with the objective of:
(a) Levying war on the government of the federal Republic of Nigeria
(b) Encouraging the killing and injuring of persons;
(c) Destroying, injuring and encouraging the destruction and injuring of property;
(d) Subverting or promoting the subversion of the Government of the Federal republic of Nigeria and its officials;
(e) Committing, inciting acts of violence and intimidation;
(f) Interfering with, resisting; encouraging interference with or resistance to the administration of Law; and
(g) Disturbing and encouraging the disturbance of peace and order in the Niger Delta States of Rivers; Delta; Edo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria contrary to section 62(2)(1) and punishable under section 63 of the Criminal Code Act Capt. 77, LFN 1990.
Count 4
That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari (m), 41 years old of No. 13 Agudama Street, D-Line, Port Harcourt and other (presently at large) on or about 28th August, 2005 at SAMSY Hotel, Benin City, Edo State within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court published a statement, rumour, report which is likely to cause fear and false alarm to the public knowing or having reason to believe that such statement, rumour, report, is false and thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under section 59 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 77 LFN 1990.
Count 5
That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari (m), 41 years old of No. 13 Agudama Street, D-Line, Port Harcourt; and others (presently at large) between year 2004 and 2005 at Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court are members of unlawful societies respectively called;
(1) "Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force" (NDPVF)
(2) Congress for the Liberation of
Ikwere People (COLIP); and
(3) Chikoko Movement and you thereby committed a felony contrary to and punishable under section 64 of the Criminal Code Act Chapter 77 LFN 1990.
Overt Acts of the Offences of Counts I and II
1. That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo
Asari and others presently at large respectively formed the following Organization: Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF); Congress for the Liberation of Ikwere People (COLIP); and Chikoko Movement; all of whom want Nigeria to disintegrate so that its ethnic nationalities, particular the Ijaw and Ikwere people, would create their own nations;
2. That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid
Dokunbo Asari; and others presently at large, attended a meeting of "The Pan Niger Delta Action Conference/Council (PANDAC)"; the meeting was attended by leaders and members of representative nationality organizations, militant formations, youth and civil society organizations from Niger Delta region, including the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteers Force (NDPVF), Chikoko Movement, Great Commonwealth of The Niger Delta (GCND), Movement for the Survival of
Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Itsekiri National Youth Council, National Youth Council of
Ogoni People (NYCOP), Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ), Congress for the Liberation of Ikwere People (COLIP), Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), Delta Stakeholder Today Peoples Council, Socialist Workers Party, Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FINDIC), National Association of Ijaw Female Students, People with Disability Action Network (PEDANET) among others on or about August 28, 2005 at Samsy Hotel Benin City in Edo State of Nigeria and issued a communiqué:
"Communique of The Strategy and Mobilization Meeting of The Pan Niger Delta Action Conference/Council (Pandac) at The Samsy Hotel, Benin City, Edo State On Sunday,August, 28, 2005";
3. That in the said communiqué referred to in paragraph 2 above and signed by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari, you alleged that the irresponsible Governors of the Niger Delta, Local Government Chairmen and NDDC Directors in connivance with the Federal Government of Nigeria looted the oil revenue accruing to the people of Niger Delta while pursuing their personal projects and aggrandizement, and therefore threatened to take" up arms against the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;
4. That at the said meeting of August 28, 2005 at Samsy HOTEL, Benin City, Edo State of Nigeria you: (1) Alhaji
Mujahid Dokunbo Asari: and others presently at large planned to cause civil disorder that would lead to the overthrow of what you called "the dictatorial government of Chief
Olusegun Obasanjo" and replace same by a Provisional Government of National Unity.
5. That you: (1) Alhaji Mujahid
Dokunbo Asari; granted interview to the Independent Newspaper that was published on September 10, 2005 in which you said:
"Nigeria is an evil entity. It has nothing to stand on and I will continue to fight and try to see that Nigeria dissolves and disintegrates and I am ready to hold on to the struggle to see to this till the day I will die. I do not see any reason why I should continue to live with people that have no relationship with me whatsoever."
Dated this 4th day of October 2005
Chief Bayo Ojo (SAN).
Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation and
Minister of Justice."
It is thus clear that all the counts are of criminal nature. The offences were all created by the Criminal Code Act and punishable by same.
The various offences set out above, if proved will each, attract a punishment of not less than three years of imprisonment. See the various sections under which the offences are punishable .i.e. Section 41; 59, 63, 64 and 516 of
the Criminal Code Act Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
Section 118 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) Cap 80, LFN, 1990 provides as follows:-
"Where a person is charged with any felony other than a felony punishable with death, the court may, if it thinks fit, admit him to bail."
(Emphasis supplied by me)
The interpretative section, section 2 of the CPA assigns the following interpretation to the word "felony" -
"'felony' means an offence on conviction for which a person can, without proof of his having been previously convicted of an offence, be sentenced to death or to
imprisonment for three years or more, or which is declared by law to be a felony."
(Underlining supplied for emphasis)
Section 118(2) of the CPA, in my view, makes the grant of bail to an accused person standing trial before a High Court, purely a discretionary matter in the hands of the trial Judge. Furthermore, where an offence carries a sentence of imprisonment for a period of three years or more, grant of bail is not a mere matter of course. It is a settled principle of law that except where a miscarriage of justice has been established or that there is a violation of some principles of law or procedure; or that the discretion is known to have been wrongly exercised, or where the exercise was tainted .with some illegality "or substantial irregularity, an appeal court seldom interferes with the learned trial Judge's exercise of discretion. This is because discretion is of the trial court and not of the appellate court hence it cannot substitute its own discretion. See the case of
Efetiroroje v. Okalefe II (1991) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt 193) 517; Royal Exchange Assurance (Nig.) Ltd, v. Aswani Textiles Ltd (1992) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 227) 1 at page 5; The Resident Ibadan Province &
Anor. v. Mamudu Lagunju (1954) WACA 549 at page 552; Anya v. A. N. N: Ltd (1992) B N.W.L.R. (Pt. 247) 319; Nzeribe v. Dave Engineering Co. Ltd (1994) 8 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 361) 124 and University of Lagos v Aigoro (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 143) 145.
In Sarami v. Kotove (1990) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 143) 144 at page 151, Obaseki, JSC, put it this way:-
"The proper role of the Court of Appeal where there is a proper exercise of discretion is not to interfere with the decision. To do so merely on the ground that the Appellate Court would have exercised the discretion differently is an assault on justice and not within the statutory powers of the Appeal Court."
It is worthy of note as well, that on a question of exercise of discretion authorities are not of much value. No two cases are exactly similar and even if they are, the court cannot be bound by a previous decision to exercise its way because that would be putting an end to discretion. No discretion in one case can be a precedent to another. See: the holding of Kay, L.J. in the case of Jenkins v. Bushby (1891) 1
Ch. 484, at page 485; see also Kudoro v. Alaka (1956) 1 FSC 82 at page 383: Solanke v. Ajibola (1968) 1 All N.L.R. 46 at page 51.
It is clear in this appeal that at the close of oral arguments by the parties before it and after considering, all the, submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respective parties, the court below, per Rhodes-Vivour, JCA; made the following conclusion:
"In the light of the above the learned trial Judge was right in refusing the application for bail by the appellant. This court will not interfere with the decision of the learned trial Judge."
The practice of the appeal courts generally, and this has been on for quite sometime, is that where there is a concurrent finding of two lower courts, the appeal court hardly interferes with it except on exceptional circumstances. See:
Igogo v. The State (1999) 12 SCNJ 140; Dogo & Ors. v. The State (2001) 1 SCNJ 315. This principle of concurrent findings/decisions of two lower courts not to be ordinarily disturbed by a higher court is respected by the courts because it is founded on the understanding that the facts that have been deliberated on by two courts carefully before they arrived at certain conclusions can be supported from the evidence laid before them particularly if much of the findings or conclusions depended on the trial court having heard and seen vital witnesses testify. In this regard it is an exclusive preserve of the trial court and an appellate court certainly lacks power to interfere. But, where the evaluation of evidence is only through documentary evidence, an appellate court has liberty to evaluate the affidavit evidence with a view to either affirming or reversing the trial court's decision depending, on the substantiality of the dispositions made by the parties. In the appeal on hand the court below made some findings of fact on the affidavit evidence. Below is what the court said:-
"Evidence available to the trial Judge and to us shows beyond doubt the threat to National Security.
A close scrutiny of the charge and documentary evidence available reveals Offences that are a real threat to National Security."
The evidence available before the two lower courts was that of affidavit evidence. The appellant as applicant before the trial court deposed to the following facts in support of his application for bail, through Daniel Nuesiri:
"1. That I am a litigation officer in Festus Keyamo Chambers, solicitors to the Accused/Applicant.
2. That I have the consent of the Applicant and my employers to depose to this affidavit.
3. That I was informed by the Accused/Applicant and I verily believe that:
a. That on Monday, September 19, 2005 the Applicant received a phone call from the Commissioner of Police, Rivers
State, to report at the Police State Command,
b. That on getting there he was asked whether he knew anything about the threat to blow up oil installations over the arrest of the
Bayelsa State Governor which he answered in the negative,
c. That he was then told that his attention was needed in Abuja after which he was whisked away through the back gate of the
command without the knowledge of his associates and friends who accompanied him to the Police Headquarters,
d. That from the 19th of September, 2005, the Applicant was in detention until the 6th of October, 2005, when he was arraigned before this Honourable Court on a five-count charge,
e. That the Accused has no criminal record and has never been tried for any offence before,
f. That the accused will not commit any similar offence or any at all if granted bail,
g. That the Accused will not impede any further investigation if granted bail,
h. That the Accused will not jump bail and will make self available for trial,
i. That the accused is worthy enough to be granted bail in self recognizance and alternatively can provide credible sureties for his bail.
4. That there is no prima facie evidence that the Accused has committed the offences for which he is charged.
5. That it will be in the interest of justice to grant this application.
6. That I depose to this affidavit in good faith."
The respondent filed a counter-affidavit. It was sworn to by one Y. S. Abubakar who averred to the following facts:-
"1. That I am a Senior Police Officer of
Nigeria Police, Force Headquarters, Abuja-FCT
2. That I am also one of the officers that investigated this case.
3. That by virtue of my said position, I am sufficiently conversant with the facts, which I herein depose.
4. That I have the consent and authority of the Complainant/Respondent to depose to this counter affidavit.
5. That I was informed by the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice on Tuesday, October 11, 2005, at 1200 hrs in his office at Federal Ministry of Justice,
Federal Secretarial Complex Abuja, and I verily believe him as follows:-
(a) That if the Accused/Applicant is released on Bail, the prosecution of the charge against him will be at risk.
(b) That most other suspects in this ease are still at large.
(c) That the available evidence against the Accused/Applicant so far is over whelming.
(d) That the Accused/Applicant is a militant Leader of a dangerous, armed and unlawful society called the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDVPF).
(e) That the Accused/Applicant have had access to and can on grant of bail, have access to dangerous weapons.
(f) That Accused/Applicant is from the riverine area of the Niger Delta of Nigeria.
(g) That the Niger Delta is an area consisting of Mangrove Swamp, numerous creeks and is an extremely difficult terrain to access,
(h) That if granted bail the Accused/Applicant will commit similar offences, interfere with the investigation of the case and not make himself available for trial.
6. That after the arrest of the Accused/Applicant, his statement was obtained wherein he confessed to the commission of the crimes
7. That I was also informed by the Hon. Attorney-General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice on Tuesday, October 11,2005, at 1200 hrs in his office at Federal Ministry of Justice, Federal Secretariat Complex Abuja, and I verily believe him that the Accused/Applicant has not shown any special circumstances warranting the grant of this application.
8. That the Accused/Applicant is healthy and he is being taken care of by the State as was seen from his entire appearance when he was arraigned before the court.
9. That the Complainant/Respondent will do all in its power to ensure a very speedy trail of the substantive case.
10. That it will be prejudicial to National Security to grant bail to the Accused/Applicant.
11. That it will be in the interest of justice to refuse this application.
12. That I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I make this declaration conscientiously believing same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oath Act."
In a reply to the counter-affidavit, Festus Keyamo learned Counsel for the appellant, deposed to the following facts:-
"1. That I am the Counsel to the accused person.
2. That I have the consent and authority of the accused person to
depose to this affidavit.
3. That the applicant himself could not depose to this affidavit because he is remanded in custody but he informed me and I verily believe the under-mentioned facts.
4. That no other person has been declared wanted by the Federal
Government in relation to this charge.
5. That there is no proof of evidence filed with this charge as such the court has nothing upon which to decide about the nature of the evidence in this case.
6. That the accused/applicant has no access to dangerous weapons.
7. That the Accused/Applicant is prepared to provide sureties from
Rivers State who know the creeks, mangrove swamps and who can locate him anytime, even though he is not prepared to escape from his trial.
8. That the Accused/Applicant has never confessed to the commission of any offence.
9. That the Accused/Applicant was never found committing any offence or arrested in the course of committing any offence as he voluntarily went to the State Command, Rivers State on invitation and he was arrested.
10. That I swear to this affidavit in good faith."
The court below commented on the affidavit evidence and other processe