In The Court of Appeal
(Lagos Judicial Division)
On Wednesday, the 2nd day of July, 2008
Suit No: CA/L/322/07
Before Their Lordships
ISA AYO SALAMI |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO |
....... Justice, Court of Appeal |
Between
1. CHRISTLIEB PLC |
Appellants |
And
1. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI |
Respondents |
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RATIO DECIDENDI |
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER - INTERIM ORDER: What is the position of the law when an interim order of injunction is made pending the determination of all applications |
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"In A.G. Fed. V. Fagunwar Chikoyi (2006) 18 NWLR (pt. 1010) CA 51 court held: "When an interim order of injunction is made pending the determination of all applications before the court once all the applications before the court are determined or if an interlocutory order of injunction is made the interim order of injunction would cease, lapse or end on the date the applications are determined or subsequent order is made". An order of injunction is not made by a court to last forever or ad infinitum. It must last for a short period and an interim order will lapse once the party against whom it was made is served with the substantive application for interlocutory order or Motion on Notice. See A.G. Fed v. Fafunwa V. Onikoyi supra; Leedo Presidential Motel Ltd. v. Bank of the North Ltd. (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 696) 364; Dogban v. Diwhre (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 274." Per NWODO, J.C.A (P.32,Paras.B-F) - read in context |
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EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION: The object of interlocutory order of injunction |
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"The object of interlocutory injunction is to protect the Applicant against injury which he would not be adequately compensated on damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial." Per NWODO, J.C.A (P.33,Para.A) - read in context |
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER - INTERLOCUTORY ORDER: Whether an interlocutory order can stand on its own |
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"It will be a mockery of the law if parties should be allowed to abandon the substantive case, after obtaining an interlocutory order that satisfies their needs. An interlocutory order cannot stand on its own, where there is a substantive case, since the Plaintiff has stated and is not willing to proceed with the Originating Summons, it is accordingly dismissed since he has benefited from it".Per NWODO, J.C.A (Pp.33-34,Paras.F-A) - read in context |
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COURT - POWER OF COURT: The limit of the power of court |
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"The inherent power of the court is no doubt wide but within an ambit. What a court is empowered to do and the failure of a court to do that which an aggrieved party complains about will depend on this court's procedural rules and law. The powers of the court under its inherent Jurisdiction are complimentary to its powers under the rules of the court. The inherent Jurisdiction of the court is a most valuable adjunct to the powers conferred on the court by the rules. See Yonwuren v. Modern Signs (Nig.) Ltd. (1985) CLR 2(a) SC."Per NWODO, J.C.A (P.24,Paras.A-D) - read in context |
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COURT - POWERS OF COURT: Whther the court has the power to intervane in special circumstancesin the light of procedural rules of court |
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"The courts power to intervene in special circumstances in the light of procedural rules of court cannot be precluded because there is no specific appeal on the decision of the court below refusing them to vacate or suspend the order." Per NWODO, J.C.A (P.31,Paras.A-B) - read in context |
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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - SECTION 16 OF THE COURT OF APPEAL ACT:Whether words used in an enactment which are clear and unambiguous, they should be accorded their ordinary and grammatical meanings |
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"The cardinal principle and rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the true intention of the legislature thus where the words used in an enactment are clear and unambiguous, they should be accorded their ordinary and grammatical meanings without any colouration. See Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.1048) 365, Agbaje v. Fashola (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1086) CA 90. The duty of the court in interpreting an unambiguous statutory provision is to declare the actual words used in the provision. The provision in 516 of the Court of Appeal Act 1976 is in pari-material with 515 of the current Court of Appeal Act 2004. 516 has been construed by the Apex Court and this court in a catalogue of cases. I will refer to just a few of them. In the case of Enekwe v. IMB (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) pg. 146 ratio 12. The Supreme Court interpreting the provisions of 516 of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 3 Rule 23 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002 held: "The provisions of section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act and Order 3 rule 23 of the Court of Appeal Rules which allow the Court of Appeal to act as if it is the trial court in certain situations are not invoked merely for the asking. Before the Court of Appeal can invoke the power, the party must how that there is a real question in controversy for the court to determine and that it is a good case for a rehearing. Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act is not in the statute to instigate competition in jurisdiction between the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The section lacks the legal capacity to wipe out the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The section is there to assist in the speedy hearing of appeals. It is not a substitute for trial procedure in the High Court. In the instant case, no useful purpose would have been served by invoking the provision as the Court of Appeal". In Balogun v. Wema Bank Plc Supra, Oguntade JCA (as he then was) held: "Ours is a Court of Appeal. Our jurisdiction is appellate. That jurisdiction can only be activated by a Notice of Appeal properly and validly filed. And the reliefs we can grant upon an appeal are circumscribed by the issues raised in the Grounds of Appeal and the reliefs sought by the appellant. In addition, we can make consequential orders which might not have been asked for by any of the parties. By the same token, we cannot make orders which are unrelated to the issues agitated in the Notice of Appeal of the appellant". Still on the scope of Sl6 of the Act, the court in Ndoma Egbe v. Government of Cross River State Supra cited by Chief Aribisala had this to say: The law is trite that a court of law should always confine itself to the jurisdiction conferred on it by the enabling statute. In the context of the Court of Appeal, both the Constitution and the Court of Appeal Act confer appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal. It cannot exercise jurisdiction of the trial court and section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act does not confer such jurisdiction on the court". The Supreme Court in Ovensori v. Osagiede (1998) considered S16 of the Court of Appeal Act along with Order 3 rule 23 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002. Iguh JSC held: "There can therefore be no doubt that the Court of Appeal, upon a consideration of the totality of all the foregoing principles of law and rules of court, had ample jurisdiction to vary the order of dismissal made by the trial court to that of the striking out of the suit, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents had not appealed against the same. The case was clearly not properly before the court and it would be idle to dismiss such an action which, to all intents and purposes, was incompetent and therefore only liable to be struck out. Issue I is therefore resolved against the appellants".Per NWODO, J.C.A (Pp.25-28,Paras.F-E) - read in context |
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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - SECTION 16 OF THE COURT OF APPEAL ACT:Whether the Court of Appeal can properly deal with an issue even though the trial court made no pronouncement on it. |
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"See also Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc v. Nwagwu (2006) 12 NWLR (pt. 995) CA 518 where this court held: "By virtue of the provision of S16 of the Court of Appeal Act 1976, the Court of Appeal can properly deal with an issue even though the trial court made no pronouncement on it. This is so because the Court of Appeal has full jurisdiction over the whole proceeding before it, as if the proceeding had been instituted in the Court of Appeal as a court of first instance. That is to say the Court of Appeal can deal with a case the same way the trial court would have done". Relying on the interpretation of S16 in the aforementioned cases which provision is in par-material with S15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004, the powers of this court under that section are only exercisable in respect of appeals before the Court of Appeal and applications made under or in connection with the appeal but once the reliefs or orders applied for in this court are unrelated with a pending appeal or issues arising therefrom, these powers may not be lawfully exercised in respect of such application. Furthermore, any order sought to be made in this court must be one which the court of trial from which the appeal arose could make. In effect, Section 15 vest this court with the power to make any order which the lower court could have made and can treat the matter as if the suit was filed in the first instance before the court. See the case of Mrs. Victoria Okotie-Eboh v. Adolo Okotie-Eboh and Others (1986) 1 SC 479. The constituent powers under this provision include the power of this court to make an interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant. In CBN v. Ahmed (2001) 5 SC (Pt. 11) pg. 146, the Supreme Court granted an injunction pending appeal even though the Notice of Appeal had not Originating Summons are not strange to the present relief, they are related and connected." Per NWODO, J.C.A (Pp.29-30,Paras.B-E) - read in context |
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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - SECTION 4 OF POLICE ACT: The duties of police |
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"By virtue of Section 4 of the Police Act, Cap 359, Laws of the Federation, 1990, the duties of the Police include amongst others the prevention and detection of crime, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged. S4 of the Police Act stipulates: "By virtue of section 2 of the Police Order Act, any police officer of the rank of Inspector or above may stop any assembly, meeting or procession for which no licence has been issued or which violates any conditions of the licence issued under section I of this Act, and may order any such assembly, meeting or procession which has been prohibited or which violates any such conditions as aforesaid to disperse immediately. In the instant case, the appellants did not obtain any licence for the assembly, therefore the police were right to disperse them". The Police are under a statutory duty to protect property and to enforce laws. When it comes to execution of court's orders, the Sheriff of the court has a role to play. However, in practice to ensure the observance of law and order, the involvement of the police becomes imperative. The Police Force are not necessary parties to the determination of the issues before this court but by virtue of their statutory powers this court can direct them to exercise same when the circumstance warrants their intervention. The present situation calls for such directive on the Police to ensure maintenance of order and protection of property during compliance to the Order of the court." Per NWODO, J.C.A (P.9,Paras.C-G) -read in context |
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REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A (Delivered the Lead Ruling): The Respondent Applicants Ademola Majekodunmi and Dr. Ime Ebong by way of Motion on Notice dated 4 September 2007 filed the same date pursuant to Order 4 Rules 3 and 5 of the 2007 Court of Appeal Rules and S15 of the Court of Appeal Act and the inherent power of the Court seeks the following orders:
"1. An ORDER voting and or suspending the interim orders of the Federal High Court per Honourable Justice I. I. Ejiofor in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 - CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI & ANOR of 12th December, 2005 and 29th March, 2006 pending the determination of the Appeal dated and filed on 7th March, 2007 by the Appellants/Respondents;
2. An ORDER allowing, the Respondents/Applicants to take possession of the assets, premises, goods and property of CHRISTLIEB PLC situate at No. 39, Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos and the fixtures and buildings thereon which the Appellants had taken possession of since 9th May, 2006 as the Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 - CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKUDUNMI & ANOR had been dismissed on the 6th of March, 2007;
3. An ORDER directing the Chief Registrar/Deputy Sheriff of the Federal High Court to assist the Respondents! Applicants in securing the possession of the assets, premises, goods and property of CHRISTLIEB PLC situate at No. 39, Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos and the fixtures and buildings therein which the Appellants had taken possession of since 9th May, 2006 as the Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 - CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI & ANOR had been dismissed on the 6th of March, 2007;
4. An ORDER directing the Inspector-General of Police and Deputy Inspector General of police Zone II, the Commissioner of Police, Lagos State Command and the Deputies, Assistants and all other officers under their command/control to assist the Respondents/Applicants in securing the possession of the assets, premises, goods and property of CHRISTLIEB PLC situate at No. 39 Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos, which the Applicants/Respondents had taken possession of since 9th May, 2006 as the Suit No. FHC/L/SC/1208/05- CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI & ANOR had been dismissed on the 6th of March, 2007;
5. An ORDER directing that inventory of the assets, goods and property of CHRISTLIEB PLC situate at No. 39, Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos be taken by the Inspector General of Police and Chief Registrar/Deputy Sheriff;
6. An ORDER directing the Appellants/Respondents to deposit the title documents of the property at No. 39, Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos belonging to CHRISTLIEB PLC in Appellants/Respondents' possession with the Chief Registrar of this Honourable Court pending the determination of this Appeal as the Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 - CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI & ANOR had been dismissed on the 6lh of March, 2007;
7. An ORDER allowing the Respondents/Applicants to pay the sum of N219, 738,051.64 (two hundred and nineteen million, seven hundred and thirty eight thousand, fifty one naira, sixty four kobo) to the Court in the name of the Deputy Chief Registrar alleged by the Appellants/Respondents to be the sum outstanding and due to the 3rd Appellants/Respondents from CHRISTLIEB PLC in Suit No. FHC/L/SC/1208/05 CHRISTLIEB PLC & ORS VS. ADEMOLA MAJEKODUNMI & ANOR by way of a bank guarantee pending the determination of this appeal;
8. An ORDER directing the Appellants/Respondents to discharge the charge by way of a Deed of legal mortgage dated Will May, 2005 registered at the lands Registry office, Lagos as charge on Title No. MO. 0828 on 22th June, 2005 of CHRISTLIEB PLC parcel of land situate at No. 39 Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos measuring 3.151 acres and more particularly delineated and shown verged "Red" on Survey Plan No. L.E.D.B/SD/40 annexed to the Land Certificate No. MO. 0828 dated 12th August, 1958 pending the determination of this appeal;
9. AND FOR SUCH further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make it the circumstances of this application.
The Applicant set out 13 grounds as basis for the reliefs sought. In support also is a 10 paragraph affidavit deposed to by David Udoh exhibiting several documents filed in the Federal High Court as exhibit A, A1, A2, B, B1, C, C1, D1, D2, E, E1, E2, E3,E4, F, G, H, J.
In response to the application the learned counsel to the Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 17 December, 2007 dated 17 December, 2007 wherein he challenged the competence of the 1 & 2 Applicants/Respondents' Motion on Notice dated 4 September, 2007 and a fortiori the Jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to hear and entertain same. The Notice of Objection is premised on the following 7 grounds:
"1. This Appeal No. CA/L/322/07 is instituted at the instance of the Appellants/Applicants and not the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
2. The 1st and 2nd Respondents do not have a cross-appeal herein challenging the exparte and or interlocutory orders issued by the trial Federal High Court in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 or indeed anything done in that suit pursuant to the orders aforesaid.
3. Not having challenged anything done in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 or the orders issued therein or the execution of same, either by way of appeal or cross-appeal in this proceedings, it is not competent of the 1st and 2nd Respondents to seek to challenge same merely by instrumentality of the application dated 4th September 2007.
4. It is not open to a party who has not appealed against a decision to seek to set aside the decision or execution of orders made in that decision.
5. That 1st and 2nd Respondents have filed two separate appeals connected with decisions made in the Suit No. FHC/L/SC/1208/05 and which bear direct relationship with the reliefs endorsed on their application.
6. By abandoning these appeals which are still pending and seeking these reliefs vide the instrumentality of this appeal, the 1st and 2nd Respondents are engaged in forum shopping in abuse of the process of this Court.
7. The application dated 4th September 2007 made by the 1st and 2nd Respondents is ultra vires the 1st and 2nd Respondents, without foundation or basis, misconceived, adventurous and utterly unknown to our legal system".
In support of the Notice is an 11 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Tola Oluwafemi, a legal practitioner; a 6 paragraph further and better affidavit filed on 16 April, 2008, a further and better affidavit filed on 21 May, 2008. Both deposed too by Rasheed Lawal.
The facts leading to the present applications are set out in the affidavit of the applicants as well as the further better affidavits of the Respondents. Briefly, the facts are as follows:
The 1st Appellant/Respondent CHRISTLIEB PLC applied and was given a trade finance facility for 400 million naira by the 3rd Appellant/Respondent - Santrust Securities Limited. The facilities were secured by a Deed of Legal Mortgage dated 10th May, 2005. Some disbursements were made to the 1st Appellant/Respondent. When the 1st Respondent did not respond to the Demand Notices to Pay, made by Santrust Securities Limited demanding the pay back of alleged outstanding sum of N219,738,051.64 (two hundred and nineteen million, seven hundred and thirty eight thousand and fifty one naira, sixty four kobo), the 3rd Appellant/Respondent acting on the Deed of the Legal Mortgage appointed the 2nd Appellant/Respondent as Receiver Manager of Christlieb Plc and proceeded to the Federal High Court. The Appellants/Respondents filed Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1208/05 on 22 May, 2005 by way of an Originating Summons seeking the several reliefs against the Defendants now Respondent Applicant in the lower court jointly and severally. He refer to the Originating Summons dated 22 November, 2005 exhibited as exhibit A.
The Appellants/Respondents also filed Motions for interim and interlocutory injunctions. The Appellant Respondent in his further affidavit averred that on the 12 of December, 2005, he obtained an interim order and on 29 March, 2006 an interlocutory order against the Respondent Applicants to take possession of the assets, goods, premises and property of CHRISTLIEB PLC. On 9 of May, 2006 the 2nd Appellant/Respondent took possession of assets and property of Christlieb Plc. The Respondents/Applicants aggrieved with the interim and interlocutory orders made in the lower court filed two Notices of Appeal against the interim and interlocutory orders. The two Notices of Appeal are in the application as Exhibits D1 and D2. Exhibit D1 is Notice of Appeal dated 20 December, 2005, D2 is the Notice of Appeal dated 29 March, 2006 filed same date, the Originating Summons on 22 January, 2007. The court below on the adjourned date for hearing of the Originating Summons, first heard the Notice of Objection filed by the Respondent Applicants, the Appellant Respondent did not react to the application. The court below on 6 March, 2007 after due consideration dismissed the suit of the Appellant/Respondent FHC/L/CS/1208/05 and adjourned the Applicant's counter claim for hearing. Respondent Applicant in their counterclaim had claimed amongst other reliefs a declaration that the appointment of the Receiver was null and void and a setting aside of the interlocutory injunction granted on 29 May, 2006.
The Appellant Respondents dissatisfied with the dismissal of the Originating Summons filed a Notice of Appeal exhibited as Exhibit E1 dated 7 March, 2007. As a result of the dismissal of the Originating Summons, the 1st Respondent Applicants realizing that the lower court did not make any consequential order to the effect of vacating the injunctive orders went back to the Federal High Court to make an order to allow the Applicant repossess Christlieb Plc assets and property in view of the dismissal order.
The Appellant Respondent filed a Motion dated 8 March, 2007 in the court below praying for Stay of Execution, restraining order and Stay of Proceedings against the order of 6 March, 2007. The trial court in its considered ruling refused to stay execution of any decision of that court but granted stay of proceedings pending appeal. The trial court also refused to grant leave to the Respondents/Applicants to issue Writ of Execution and allow Applicants to take possession of CHRISTLIEB PLC and ruled he was funtus officio as stay of proceedings had been granted in the same Suit FHC/L/CS/1208/05 and that they were appeals pending. The Respondent Applicants then filed the present application in this court.
The Learned Senior Advocate R. Tarfa arguing the application orally on the 28 May, 2008 formulated six issues for determination. Chief A. Aribisala (SAN) in response to the application had filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection; he addressed the court on the competence of the application before the court. He did not formulate issues for determination.
I will first consider the Notice of Preliminary Objection before the determination of the Motion on Notice.
Chief Aribisala's (SAN) contention is that this court cannot grant relief 1 to 8 because the matter is a subject of Receivership. He submits the Federal High Court did not vest any asset on the Receiver as the power of the Receiver Manager was vested on the Receiver by the Deed of Appointment made outside the court. He contends that once a receiver is appointed, it is the appointee that can discharge the receivership and not the court. He cited the following cases: WEMA Bank v. Onafowoke & Other (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) pg. 410, rato 2 & 3; UNIBEX Nigeria Ltd. v. C.E.C.L. (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 816) pg. 402. It is his further submission that the issue the Applicants are asking the court to determine has no relevance to the appeal.
He cited Balogun v. WEMA Bank Plc (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 654) pg. 652.
He referred to Order 4 and Rule 4 of the Rules of court and contends the present issue is not a novel one as the position was dealt with in the case of Uduma v. Government of Cross River State (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 188) pg. 773 rato 21.
He submits that since the order sought for is not connected to the pending Notice of Appeal filed, the only way the Applicants can succeed in making such application is when appeal has been entered. The Learned Senior Advocate further submits it is only then S15 and S16 of Court of Appeal Act can be raised.
He cited Eniekwu v. International Merchant Bank Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) pg. 146 rato 12, Okonkwo v. Mode Nig. Ltd. (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 728) pg. 588; Gombe v. P.W.U. Nig. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) pg. 402 rato 1 and S240 of the 1999 Constitution considered in FAMFA Oil Ltd. v. Act. Of the Federation (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) pg. 453 rato 9.
R. Tarfa (SAN) in reply submits that the case of UNIBEX v. WEMA Bank Supra cited is not applicable under Issue 1 he canvassed the powers of the court to grant the reliefs sought. He referred to Order 4 Rules 3, 4 & 5, the case of Iweka v. ACOA Nig. Ltd. (2000) 3 SC 21 at pg. 39 and S16 of the Court of Appeal Act. He also cited Ovenseri v. Osagiede (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.572) pg.1 particularly at page 4. On the powers of the court to suspend orders of the lower court he cited SPDC v. Unu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 567) at 672 particularly 684 to 685 paragraph E to F. Chief Aribisala (SAN) did not reply specifically to issues 2 - 5 formulated by R. Tarfa (SAN). However, 1 have distilled two issues from his submission in support of his contention that this court lacks the competence to grant the application. The two issues are as follows:
First is whether this court can discharge the Receiver appointed by Deed of Appointment outside the court having not vested the assets on him. Secondly, whether by virtue of S15 & S16 of the Court of Appeal Act this court can grant the reliefs sought as they are not connected in any way to the pending appeal. Issue one raised by the Learned Senior Counsel to the Respondent Applicant is similar except for the use of phrase. I will consider the two issues together since they are related.
Having carefully gone through the affidavit in support of the application, the affidavits and further further affidavits in support of the Notice of the Objection inclusive of the documents exhibited, one fact indisputable is that the court below dismissed the Originating Summons filed by the Appellant/Respondent wherein they sought 6 reliefs which includes Declaratory, Injunctive Reliefs, Restraining Order against the present Applicant from entering into or remaining in possession of any assets and property of the 1st Appellant/Respondent. It is equally obvious from the exhibited documents that at the time of dismissal the Learned Trial Judge had made an interlocutory injunctive order against the applicant; ordering the Appellant Respondents to take possession of assets and properties of Christlieb Plc on 9 of May, 2006. The Learned Trial Judge had also made an order staying proceedings in the lower court. Thus the crux of these application by Notice is whether the Applicant who is dissatisfied with the decision of the court below wherein the Learned Trial Judge refused to make consequential order discharging the interlocutory injunctive orders can get redress in this court in the absence of a specific valid appeal in respect of the injunctions order in FHC/L/CS/1208/2005.
The interlocutory order of the court below on 29 March, 2006 passed the possession of parcel of land together with the building at No. 39 Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos on to the 2nd Appellant Respondent. Exhibit D is the Deed of Appointment of the Receiver Manager dated 7 of November, 2005, Exhibit C1 is the enrolled Order of