AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of Court of Appeal, Port-Harcourt Division ( the Lower Court for short) delivered on 3rd day of July, 2012 which affirmed the decision of the Federal High Court, Port-Harcourt division [hereinafter referred to as ( the trial Court") delivered on 21st July 2009. The trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant, (then accused person] by summary trial procedure, when he was arraigned before it, on allegation of (knowingly) being found in possession of 200grammes of Indian hemp [otherwise known as cannabis sativa], a narcotic drug, contrary to Section 19 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, Cap N30, LFN 2004 following the accused/appellant's plea of guilty' of the offence.
The case of the prosecution now respondent, at the trial Court as could be gathered from the record, was that sometimes in May 2009, the operative staff of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (hereinafter) simply referred to as [NDLEA] arrested the appellant for being found in possession of Indian Hemp as well as peddling in same. Immediately after being arrested, the appellant voluntarily confessed to the staff of NDLEA through a confessional statement owning up to the fact, that the substance was actually recovered from him and that he was a dealer in such drug or substance. When he was arraigned before the trial Court on 20th July, 2009, he maintained his earlier stance and pleaded guilty of the offence he was charged with at the trial Court after the charge was read and explained to him. The case was then adjourned to 21st July, 2009.
At the resumed sitting of the trial Court on 21st July 2009, the accused/appellant was represented by a counsel. When the case was called on that day, the learned counsel representing the accused/appellant informed the trial Court that the appellant intended to change his plea from "guilty to NOT guilty . In that situation, the trial Court then read over and explained the charge to the accused/appellant again to his understanding. When asked to enter his plea, the accused/appellant still maintained his earlier stance and still pleaded guilty to the charge. With that development, the prosecutor later tendered seven documentary and other exhibits, which were admitted in evidence without any opposition by the defence counsel. The exhibits so tendered and admitted in support of the charge at the trial are as follows:-
(1) The certificate of test Analysis form.
(2) Packing of Substance form.
(3) Report of Scientific Analysis Form.
(4) Receipt issued to the Accused person in respect of the seized drug.
(5) Drug Analysis Report.
(6) Confessional Statement of the Accused person.
(7) 200 grams of Cannabis Sativa read to the accused person.
It needs to be stressed here, that after the exhibits were tendered, the learned defence counsel informed the trial Court, that he was not objecting to the admission of such exhibits in evidence hence the trial Court admitted them in evidence and marked them as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
The learned trial judge thereafter convicted the accused and sentenced him to one and half years imprisonment on 21/7 /2009 with an order that the sentence be backdated to have commenced from the date of his arrest by NDLEA staff i.e. 20th May, 2009.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence handed down by the trial Court, the accused/appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Port-Harcourt Division (Coram M. D. Muhammed JCA (as he then was, now JSC), Istifanus Thomas JCA (of blessed memory) and T. O. Awotoye JCA) i.e. the Lower Court, which dismissed the appellant's appeal when in its judgment it held thus:-" ... Sections 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act are in my view not useful for the accused where he has confessed as the instant case. A confessional statement is a self-indictment and it is binding on the maker. See AMANCHUKWU'S case (supra) at 489.....
This appeal lacks merit.
I resolve the sole issue formulated by me in favour of the respondent.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed"
The Appellant still dissatisfied with the judgment of the Lower Court, further appealed to this Court. He sequel to that, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 26/7/2012, containing eight grounds of appeal. Out of the eight grounds of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant proposed two issues for the determination of this appeal and these issues are:-
(a) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were not wrong in holding that the plea of guilt by the appellant was enough and sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant? (Grounds 1, 4, 5, 6 & 8).
(b) Whether the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were not wrong in holding that failure of the prosecution to serve exhibits used in the trial was not fatal to the entire proceedings? (Grounds 2 & 3).
Upon being served with the Appellant's brief of Argument, the learned counsel for the respondent more or less adopted the two issues for determination raised in the appellant's brief of argument as set out supra, even though he couched them differently. I shall still reproduce them simply for record purpose and for ease of reference. The dual issues raised by him read as below:-
(1) Whether the plea of guilty by the Appellant relieved the respondent of the duty of proving its case against Appellant beyond reasonable doubt? (Grounds 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 of Notice of Appeal).
(b) Whether the non service of Exhibits on the Appellant prior to their being tendered in Court coupled with the reliance by the Court, on the review of facts by the prosecutor in the absence of witness resulted to miscarriage of Justice? (Grounds 2 and 3).
The two issues raised by the appellant set out above and the corresponding issues formulated in the respondent's brief, of argument also reproduced above, will be considered serially. Advancing arguments in support of the first issue supra, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the charge on which the appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted and sentenced by the trial Court was not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, now respondent and therefore the Court below was wrong to have affirmed such conviction and sentence by the trial Court. He stated that notwithstanding the fact that the appellant as an accused before the trial Court had pleaded guilty to the charge, still the prosecution was not relieved of its responsibility to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt as required by Section 135 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended) which replaced Section 138 (1) and (2) of the old Evidence Act 2004 LFN. The learned appellant's counsel submitted, rightly in my view, that the prosecution always has the burden to prove the ingredients of the offence it charges the accused of committing, by virtue of Section 136(1) of the Evidence Act even though the burden may shift in the course of the trial in situation, for instance, where some of the ingredients of the offence require knowledge with regard to the facts to be proved. He on this latter submission, referred to and relied on the provisions of Section 140 of the Evidence Act read with Section 139(3) (a) of the Evidence Act. He further relied on the provisions of Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 [as amended] which has to do with presumption of innocence of every accused person brought before a Court of law, until proven guilty. Learned counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the combined effect of the provisions of Sections 135 (1) & (2), 136(1) and (2) and 140 of the Evidence Act (as amended) and Section 36 (5) (6) (a) (b) and  of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended] all read together, require that all the ingredients of the offence the accused/appellant was charged with must be proved beyond reasonable doubt even in a situation where he pleaded guilty to the charge as in this instant case. He contended that the prosecution failed to discharge that burden placed on it to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt but it merely relied on the admission or plea of guilty on the appellant which led to his conviction and subsequent sentence by the trial court as affirmed on appeal, by the Court below. In a further submission, the learned appellant's counsel argued that Exhibits 1 to 7 tendered by the prosecution in proof of its case did not prove the elements of the offence. In another submission, the appellant's counsel argued that the offence the accused/appellant pleaded guilty to, could only be constituted by expert evidence which accordingly to him, was lacking in this instant case, especially in view of the contradictory, inconsistent and doubtful evidence led by the prosecution, now respondent. He cited relied on the cases of Abele v Tiv Native Authority Native Authority (1963) NWLR 425; Stevenson v Police (1966) 2 ALL NLR 161. Ishola v. The State (1969) 1 NNLR 259 at 260 - 261; Essien v R 13 WACA 6. The learned appellant's counsel again submitted that prosecution failed to prove that the 20 grams contained in Exhibit 3 sent for forensic analysis on 15/6/2009 was the same as the 5grams Exhibit 5 which it said it received and analysed as there was no evidence in that regard. See Koiki vs The State (1976) 10 NSCC 151, He argued that the inconsistencies in Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 are such inconsistencies which clearly showed that the appellant did not intend to admit the truth of all the essential ingredients of the offence to which he pleaded guilty hence the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the trial court is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for appellant made it part of his submission that the prosecutor at the trial Court was wrong to have tendered Exhibits 1 to 7 since she was not the maker, as such the evidence so tendered, was mere hearsay and ought not be admitted in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 205 and 208 of the Evidence Act. He urged this Court to resolve this issue in his favour. Reacting to the appellant's learned counsel s submissions on this issue which corresponds with or similar to issue No.1 he raised in his brief of argument, the learned counsel for the respondent emphasised on the constitutional provisions on presumption of every accused person to be innocent until proven guilty by virtue of Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution. He as well, agreed that the law requires the prosecution to prove its case against an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, in order to obtain conviction as required by Section 138 of the old Evidence Act (now Section 35 of the new Act). See State vs Danjuma (1997) 5 SCNJ 126. He contended that where an accused pleads guilty to a charge, the trial Court if satisfied that the confessional statement was direct, positive and voluntary as in this instant case, it could safely convict him as done in this case. See Ogudo v State  18 NWLR (Pt.1278) 1. Learned respondent's counsel further argued that plea of guilt by an accused person is tantamount to a confession to the commission of the offence for which he was charged. He said by the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession is an admission made at anytime by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. See Rabiu vs State (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.925) 491. He said that if a trial judge is satisfied with admission of guilt of an offence by an accused person, he can proceed to convict him without necessarily calling on the prosecution to call or adduce evidence since "that which is admitted need no further proof. He said a confession which satisfies all the requirements of the law is admissible in evidence and such would relieve the prosecution calling evidence in order to secure conviction. See Osuagwu v State (2009) 1 NWLR (Pt.123) 523 and Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act. See also DANGTOE vs PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.717) 137 at 159. He emphasised that a free and voluntary confession of guilt made by an accused if direct and positive, is sufficient to warrant conviction even without any corroborative evidence as long as the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession. See Okewu v. FRN (2005) All FWLR (Pt.254) 858; Ubierho v. State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt.919) 644; Enweluku v The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30; Akpan v. State (2001) 15 NWLR [Pt.737) 745. The Learned counsel contended that there was no inconsistencies or contradictions between Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 5 as, submitted by the appellant's counsel, and even if there were, they were not fatal to the case for the prosecution as they were not material contradictions. See Okoro v State (2012) 15 SC (Pt.1); State vs Salawu (2011) 6 7 SC (Pt.5) 147; Chukwume vs FRN (2011) 5 SC (Pt.11) 84. On the point that the prosecution failed to call witnesses, the learned respondent's counsel argued that the law does not impose a duty on it, to call a hog of witnesses to prove its case, but only to call adduce credible and reliable witnesses or evidence. With regard to summary trial, the respondent's counsel stated tltat Section 218 of Criminal Procedure Act gives trial courts power to summarily try accused person who chooses to plead guilty to a charge where such offence[s] which are not capital offences. See Omoju vs FRN  7 NWLR (Pt.1055) 38. Learned counsel for the respondent finally urged us to resolve this issue in his favour. The appellant herein, as an accused before the trial Court stood the trial thereat, to the charge which I will reproduce below:-
''CHARGE That you ABOBO BAALO male, on or about the 29th day of May, 2009 at AP Refinery, Okrika Khana Local Government Area of Rivers State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court without lawful authority did knowingly possessed (sic) 200grammes of Indian Hemp (otherwise known as cannabis sativa) a narcotic drug similar to cocaine, Heroin and LSD and thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under Section 19 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act Cap N.30 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004".
When the appellant was arrested on 29/5/2009, he made a statement in which he confessed committing the offence as shown in the confessional statement he voluntary made which is direct and positive, wherein the accused/appellant inter-alia stated as below:-
"As I was not washing car again one Mr. Alo approached me to sell Indian Hemp for him which I agreed and he was paying me commission. On the 20th May 2009, a team officers came to my area and arrested me but my boss Alo escaped they caught me with some Indian Hemp in a tray pun and some wrapping"
When the accused/appellant was on 20th, July 2009 arraigned before the trial Court, the above charge was read and explained to him and he pleaded guilty to the charge, albeit, on that day he was not represented by a counsel but yet he told the trial Court that he was ready to make his plea even before the charge was read to him and his plea taken. The Court then, adjourned the case to the previous day, that was 21/7/2009 at 12noon to review the case. Then on 21st July, 2009, the trial Court reconvened but this time the accused/appellant was represented by a counsel one Abdul Mohammed. After the appearances of parties counsel were recorded, the defence counsel Abdul Mohammed announced to the trial Court that the accused intended to change his plea. Thereupon, the relevant proceedings of the trial court proceeded as shown on pages 19 to 21 of the Record and is reproduced hereunder:-
Sgt Judge 21/7//2009
Mrs. I. N. Ogar for the prosecution
Abdul Mohammed for the Accused
Sgt R. M. Aikawa
Abdul Mohammed - The Accused person intends to change his plea.
Court - to accused person -
Do you understand the charge?
Accused - I understand, I plead guilty
Mrs I. N. Ogar - I apply for a review of the facts of the case
Abdul - We are ready
Ogar - The facts of the case are as per charge dated 7th July, 2009 in support of the charge we have the followings to tender:-
(1) The Certificate of Test Analysis Form
(2) Packing of substance Form
(3) Report of Scientific Analysis Form
(4) Receipt issued to the accused person in respect of the seized drug
(5) Drug Analysis report
(6) Confessed Statement of the accused person (7) 200 grams of cannabis sativa read to the accused person.
Abdul - I have no objection Court - The documents and items tendered are hereby admitted and marked Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively Sgt R. M. Aikawa Judge 21/7/2009 Mr. Ogar - I urge the Court to convict the accused person as charged.
It is worthy of note from the above proceedings, that even though the learned defence counsel announced that the accused wanted to change his earlier plea which he made the previous day (20/7/2009), the latter still maintained his earlier plea of guilt, Again, when the prosecution sought to tender the seven exhibits listed above, the defence counsel did not object at all, Sequel to that the learned trial judge did not hesitate to convict the appellant under summary trial procedure pursuant to Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act, bearing in mind also, that the appellant had earlier made a voluntary confessional statement [Exhibit 6) which was direct and positive. The learned defence counsel also did not oppose the summary trial procedure the trial court wanted to adopt at the trial in convicting the accused person under Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 218 of the Criminal Procedure Act reads thus:-
"If the accused pleads guilty to any offence with which he is charged, the Court shall record his plea as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essential of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty, the Court shall convict him of that offence and pass sentence upon or make an order against him unless there shall appear sufficient cause to the contrary"
The antecedents of this case yet brings to fore the propriety of summary trial in criminal proceedings. Where an accused person is arraigned before a criminal Court and he pleads guilty of the offence or charge he is facing trial after the charge was read and explained to him, the trial Court is free to adopt summary trial and convict and sentence him, provided the Court is satisfied that he really understood the charge read and explained to him before he admitted his guilt of committing such offence. The summary trial procedure is adopted to avoid a prolong, full-blown trial and the rigours associated with same. To my mind, Summary trial is not only beneficial to the court but is also of great benefit to the accused. The advantage in Summary trial is that it speeds up the trial thereby saving a lot of cost and time. This Court in several decided authorities has commended the use of summary trial procedure and under-scored its importance. The apex Court has infact given insight guide and had also explicated and expounded the wisdom in summary trial procedure in the case of SAMUEL AYO OMOJU VS FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2008) 7 NWLR [PT.1085) 38. Therefore, if an accused person pleads guilty of committing an offence, it would be unnecessary to embark on full-blown trial, hence the issue of fairness or unfairness regarding the hearing is of no moment. To put it in another words, by entering of a guilty plea, hearing is foreclosed, as the next and last procedural step the trial judge should take is to admit any evidence tendered by the prosecution (if any) and then it will proceed to convict the accused person and sentence him appropriately, By pleading guilty to a charge, one can safely say that the accused person has willfully made easy and light, the task on the prosecution to lead evidence to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt as required by the law i.e. Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, (as amended) or Section 138 of the old Evidence Act. The accused person by his plea of guilt, has indeed owned up and admitted his guilt. Another advantage of summary trial is that if an accused person pleads guilty as in the present case, there is the possibility for him to enjoy some degree of indulgence with regard to leniency and may also earn him less stringent penalty, since by his early plea of guilt, he had relieved the Court of rigorous, lengthy and time consuming trial which often prevails in a lengthy and sometime complicated trial.
It is apt to say, that in this instant case, the accused person now appellant despite his earlier plea of guilt at the trial Court, he had earlier made a voluntary confessional statement which was tendered and admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit 6 without any opposition from his defence counsel. It would appear to me, that the plea of guilt and confession are tied together or interwoven. The two are infact inseparable and they are therefore six of one, half a dozen of the other. Perhaps the only distinction between the two of them is that one comes before the other or in other words, one is before the court i.e. the plea of guilt, while the other is simply an extra judicial statement made to the arresting authority concerned i.e. the confession. Each of these two notions can also lead to Summary trial. Infact, this Court in the case of EFFIONG VS THE STATE (1988) 8 NWLR (Pt.562) 362 had this to say.
"... a free and voluntary confession of guilt by an accused person whether under cross examination before a Magistrate or otherwise if it is direct and positive and duly made and satisfactorily proved, it is sufficient to warrant conviction without any corroborating evidence as long as the Court is satisfied of the truth of the confession". It is my view therefore, that convicting an accused person on his confessional statement alone, is more or less a summary trial. On most of occasions, an accused person who made confession in his extrajudicial statement, as in this instant case, will most likely end up entering a plea of guilt. In that case, the confessional statement is like a preamble before his actual arraignment in Court where he will formally and eventually plead guilty to the charge, after same was read and explained to him in open Court and which may lead the Court to adopt summary trial procedure. All that I am trying to say here is that the issues involved in Summary trial are sequential, in the sense that confession by the accused person usually precedes the plea of guilt before the judge before whom he is actually arraigned. Summary trial therefore brings about quick and instant judgment as the Court is free to give verdict without wasting time.
This is in tandem with the well settled principle of law that 'facts admitted need no further proof' . In the present case, the appellant, as an accused at the trial Court, by his confessional statement as well as his plea of guilt at the trial Court, had unequivocally and unambiguously admitted committing the offence he was charged with. In fact, the scenario in this case is even more compelling, in the sense that, after pleading guilty to the charge on the first day when he was arraigned before the trial Court on 20th July 2012, albeit then not represented by counsel, he pleaded guilty to the charge and even when represented by counsel on 21/7/2012, despite the fact that his defence counsel ABDUL MOHAMMED informed the trial Court that the accused intended to change his plea to "not guilty" from his earlier plea of 'guilty', yet the accused/appellant still maintained his previous plea of "guilt" . I will now come to Section 218 of the Crininal Procedure Act which I have extensively reproduced earlier in this judgment. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that even though as he conceded, the appellant admitted the offence by pleading guilty to same, the prosecution still had the burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Although I have answered that question supra, I will still repeat that, where there is an admission of the commission of the offence alleged, the question of establishing the burden on the prosecution to prove the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt would then not arise. Similarly, the question of violating the right of the accused to fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36 of 1999 Constitution becomes a non-issue. See the case of DANGTOE VS PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.717) 132 at 159. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant on the duty of the prosecution to lead or tender expert evidence to establish that the weeds or substance found in possession of the accused was really Indian Hemp, has some sence and I agree with him to the extent only, that evidence has to be led to show that what he admitted being found in possession of, is cannabis sativa, since the offence is a specialized one, For instance, if the prosecution had failed to adduce evidence of the government chemist or scientific analyst on that or that the analyst later confirms that the substance sent to him for analysis was infact not cannabis sativa, then the conviction cannot stand. But in this instant case, the prosecution had tendered owning exhibits before the accused/appellant was convicted namely, the following (1) forensic analysis report, (2) sample of the recovered substance  packing of substance form and Certificate of test analysis confirming that the substance recovered from him was cannabis sativa. The appellant in his confessional statement had admitted possessing the substance before he pleaded guilty to the charge in Court. All the exhibits mentioned supra were tendered and admitted in evidence by the trial Court in the presence of the defence counsel who did not object to their admission in evidence. The dust the appellant s learned counsel tried to raise on whether the 20 grammes sample sent to government chemist for analysis were part of the consignment recovered from him is in my view untenable because there was no such evidence led to suggest that they were tampered with after the packing or at the government chemist or elsewhere. The defence counsel also never raised such suspicion at the trial as he willingly conceded to the admission of all the exhibits mentioned above. Also neither the defence counsel nor the accused/appellant denied that he witnessed the packing process at the police station or signing the relevant forms used or denied signing the said forms. The learned appellant counsel's assertion that the exhibits were tendered and admitted after he pleaded guilty to the charge in Court was irregular when Summary trial procedure is adopted by a trial Court is in my candid view not fatal to the prosecution's case, I hold the view that what is crucial is whether before the conviction of the accused person, it was established that what was recovered from him to which he confessed as having possessed and the offence he subsequently pleaded guilty to, was not that such substance or weeds contained cannabis sativa as provided in the law creating the offence he was charged with. All these conditions have been fulfilled or met and settled, in view of the chemist report Exhibit 5. The learned counsel for the appellant in his brief of argument seems to castigate the trial Court for not complying with Section 218 of Criminal Procedure Act especially where it provides;-
".... and if satisfied that he intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence of which he has pleaded guilty ....... unless there shall appear sufficient cause to the contrary .
He then proceeded to argue that the contents of Exhibits 3 and 5 made it clear that the appellant did not intend to admit the truth of all the essentials ingredients of the offence of which he pleaded guilty to terms of Section 218 of CPA. With due deference to the learned counsel for the appellant I am unable to see anywhere in the provisions under reference, where it was suggested that the trial Court must ask the accused (now appellant) if he admits each and every essential ingredient of the offence to which he pleaded guilty. All that the provisions require is that the Court must be satisfied that the accused person intended to admit the truth of all the essentials of the offence. It is the state of the mind of the Court or judge that is of paramount importance. Once the trial judge is satisfied, he can convict and sentence the offender. In my view, the mindset of the Court is positive that all along, the appellant wanted to consistently maintain his plea. Perhaps it could be correct to say that it was the defence counsel that wanted the accused/appellant to change his plea to NOT GUILTY" from his earlier plea of guilty but to his utter dismay, the accused remained adamant and consistently maintained his earlier plea, notwithstanding the fact, that he heard when his defence counsel informing the trial Court on 21/7/2012 that he (accused) intended to change his plea. My lords, permit me to say a word or two on the confessional statement made by the accused/appellant not so long after his arrest. In that confessional statement admitted in evidence as Exhibit 6, the appellant, inter-alia, stated thus:-
"As I was not washing car again, one Mr. Alo approached me to sell Indian Hemp for him which I agreedand he was paying me commission. On the 20th May, 2009, a team of officers came to my area and arrested me but my boss Alo escaped. They caught me with some Indian hemp in a tray and some wrapping".
With this revelation coupled with plea of guilt of the appellant, the trial Court had all reason to believe that the appellant had intended to admit his guilt of the offence. There is nothing gained in saying that the above confession was voluntarily made by the appellant and it was direct and positive and was also admitted without any objection. I am aware of the desirability of the law, for a trial Court to look for evidence outside the confession of the accused/appellant before it convicts solely, on confession of an accused person See RABIU V STATE (2005) 7 NWLR [Pt.925) 491. Let me however pause here to say that the law says that it is only "DESIRABLE" and not compulsory. Once the Court is satisfied of its voluntariness and that it was direct and positive, it can proceed to convict on it. Be that as it may, even in this instant case, there are other pieces of evidence produced by the prosecution on which the trial Court relied to convict the accused/appellant. Some of these corroborative pieces of evidence include the under listed exhibits:-
(1) Certificate of test Analysis For (Exhibit 1)
(2) Packing of substance Form (Exhibit 2)
(3) Report of Scientific Analysis Form (Exhibit 3)
(4) Receipt issued to the accused in respect of the seized drug (Exhibit 4)
(5) Drug analysis Report (Exhibit 5)
(6) The 200 grammes cannabis sativa (Exhibit 6) recovered from the appellant.
All these exhibits as I said earlier, were admitted in evidence during the trial without any opposition. Therefore, the trial Court was free to convict the appellant even on his voluntary confessional statement alone which was duly and sufficiently corroborated, not to even talk about his repeated and incessant pleas of guilt.
Learned counsel made heavy weather on what he regarded as contradictions or inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecution such as on quantity of weeds recovered from the appellant as endorsed on Exhibits 3 & 5, for instance, 200 grammes and 5 grammes as mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 5 respectively, Here I do not see any contradiction because Exhibit 3 was a report of the analyst on the substance sent to him for analysis while Exhibit 5 was simply drug analysis report.
Other alleged contradiction in the evidence of the prosecution raised by the learned counsel for the appellant