Court name
Supreme Court
Case number
FSC 236 of 1960

Commissioner of Police, Western Region v 1. Aloysius Igw 2. Agugo Nwagare 3. Daniel Unuoma (FSC 236 of 1960) [1961] NGSC 2 (09 January 1961);

Law report citations
(1961) All N.L.R. 9
Media neutral citation
[1961] NGSC 2
Ademola, CJF
Brett, FJJ
Taylor, FJJ



                                                     1. ALOYSIUS IGW

                                                     2. AGUGO NWAGARE

                                   3. DANIEL UNUOMA (RESPONDENTS)

                                                         (1961) All N.L.R. 9



Division: Federal Supreme Court

                          Date of Judgment: 9th January, 1961

                          Case Number: FSC 236/1960

                          Before: Ademola, C.J.F.

                                       Brett, F.J.J.

                                       Taylor, F.J.J.

Three police constables went to the house of Accused No. 1 to execute a search warrant. As one of them was reading it out, Accused No. 1 told his wife to throw a bag away; she took it and ran out. One of the constables pursued her, the accused followed and assaulted him. The constables were in mufti, but one of them had been, earlier, to the house, and was known to Accused No. 1 to be a constable. The search warrant gave another name, not that of Accused No.1.


The Magistrate convicted: he found that the accused knew the men were policemen, and that they assaulted one of them while in the lawful execution of his duty. On appeal by the accused, the Judge acquitted them on the ground that the constables had no warrant to search the premises of Accused No. 1, who was therefore entitled to defend his rights if the police wanted to force the issue as it appeared they did.


On appeal from the High Court by the police-




(1) The constables were never told to leave the premises, so they were not trespassers when assaulted.


(2) When assaulted, the constables, their reasonable suspicions having been aroused as to the contents of the bag, which Accused No. 1 told his wife to throw away, were endeavouring to prevent her and were acting in the execution of their duty.


The offence is, not assaulting a police officer knowing him to be in the execution of his duty, but assaulting him while acting in the execution of his duty.


Appeal allowed. Magistrate's Judgment restored.


Cases referred to:-


R. v. Forbes and Webb, 10 Cox 362.


R. v. Maxwell and Clanchy, 2 Cr. App. R. 26, 27.


R. v. Quinn, 10 W.A.C.A. 243; R. v. Lisle, 1936, 2 K.B., 434.


APPEAL from High Court of Western Region.


George, Assistant D.P.P., for Appellant.


Aghahowa for Respondents.


Taylor, F.J., delivering the Judgment of the court:-The appellant in this appeal, the Commissioner of Police, Western Region, was the complainant in the court of Trial where the present three respondents were tried and convicted of unlawfully assaulting Police Constable Christopher Oboh while acting in the lawful execution of his duty contrary to section 356(2) of the Criminal Code. On appeal to the High Court of the Benin Judicial Division, the learned Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentences passed on the present respondents by the Senior Magistrate and substituted therefore a verdict of acquittal. It is from this Judgment of the High Court that the Commissioner of Police, Western Region, who, being the prosecutor, can appeal only on a question of law in this matter, has appealed to this Court.

The only ground of appeal argued before us was ground 1, which states that:-

    The learned Judge of appeal erred in law in holding that the Police Constable Christopher Oboh was not acting in the execution of his duty when he was assaulted by the accused persons.

     During the course of his argument, learned Counsel for the appellant dealt with the following two matters:-

            (a) Whether knowledge of the fact that the man assaulted was in fact a police constable was an essential ingredient of the offence required to be proved by the prosecution, and secondly;

            (b) whether the police constable was or was not at the time of the offence acting in the execution of his duty.

The facts relevant to the appeal and particularly to the ground of appeal argued were as follows:-

Three constables in plain clothes proceeded in company of other persons to the house and premises of the First respondent in order to execute a search warrant-exhibit "A." One of these constables, prosecution witness 4, had, the previous month, had occasion to visit the First respondent in the latter's house in connection with stolen property, so that the First respondent was known to him as was deposed to by him. On arrival, one of the constables, prosecution witness 3, Constable Oboh brought out a search warrant and proceeded to read it out to the First respondent. In the course of his doing so, a lady, who was the Fourth accused in the court of first instance and was there discharged on a submission of no case to answer, entered the house of the First respondent, her husband. As she did so the First respondent spoke to her in the Ibo language, telling her to throw away a certain bag, whereupon she got hold of the bag and started to run outside with it. The Third prosecution witness, Constable Oboh, pursued her and they were followed by the three respondents and the remaining two constables. The lady threw the bag over the fence into the bush, and as prosecution witness 3 tried to climb the fence, the respondents set upon him, beat him and tore his clothes. The other constables were also assaulted by a crowd which gathered at the scene.

The trial Magistrate after a full consideration of the evidence before him, held that the respondents knew that the policemen were in fact policemen at the time of the assault and further that the Third prosecution witness was assaulted by the respondents in the lawful execution of his duty. As a result he found the respondents guilty as charged and passed sentences of 18 months, 12 months and 12 months imprisonment with hard labour on the three respondents respectively.

The learned Judge on appeal, reversing the decision of the Trial Magistrate held as follows:-

In my opinion the Police Constables did not have a search warrant to be executed on the premises of the first appellant, and on the evidence of the prosecution, it is doubtful as to whether the first appellant believed that P.C. Oboh and others were constables.

If P.C. Oboh did not have a search warrant in respect of the premises of the first appellant, the appellant was entitled to defend his rights if the police wanted to force the issue as it appeared they did.

In an earlier passage in the Judgment of the learned judge on appeal he said that:-

If the warrant was read as alleged to the first appellant and he believed that it was not meant for him, Alloysius Igwe, but for Amos or Anna of Ibo, he was within his rights to ask the constables who were in mufti to go away. Counsel for the appellant in the course of his argument contended that a Court of Appeal should not reverse a finding of fact of the lower Court where the Appeal Court is in some doubt on the evidence, as he contended the Judge of appeal was, as shown in the passage to which I have made reference. The Trial Judge's Judgment does not, however, rest on this point, but on the issue of whether, the search warrant being defective through a misnomer, the constables were lawfully acting in the execution of their duty. There is therefore no need to say more on this point than to refer to a short Judgment of the Recorder of London in the case of R. v. Forbes & Webb 10 Cox 362, approved of by the Lord Chief Justice in R. v. Maxwell & Clanchy 2 C.A.R. 26 at 27. In the former case a submission was made by Counsel for the accused that there was no evidence to go to the Jury in support of the count for the assault on the policemen in the execution of their duty, because in consequence of their being in mufti, the prisoner did not know they were policemen. The Recorder, however, held that:-

The offence was, not assaulting them knowing them to be in execution of their duty, but assaulting them being in the execution of their duty.

Be that as it may, as I have said, the decision of the Judge of appeal rested on the other point to which I now turn. One must but agree with the general proposition of law stated by the Judge of appeal on this point and which has been quoted in an earlier passage in this Judgment. The learned Judge in applying the principle gathered from the cases of R. v. Flight Lieutenant Austin Robert Quinn 10 W.A.C.A. 243 and Davis Lisle 1936 2 K.B. 434, to the facts of the case before him seems to have lost sight of the fact that at no time from the stage when the police officers entered the house of the first respondent to the time when they were assaulted were they ever told in so many words to leave the premises. This point formed the ratio decidendi in the case of Davis Lisle, where Lord Hewart, C.J., said at 437 that:-

Admittedly, the officers had no warrant entitling them to search the premises. It is one thing to say that the officers were at liberty to enter the garage to make an inquiry, but quite a different thing to say that they were entitled to remain when, not without emphasis, the appellant had said: "Get outside. You cannot come here without a search warrant." From that moment on, while the officers remained where they were, it seems to me that they were trespassers.

In the present appeal the police officers were never trespassers, for the reason already given. Further, at the time of the assault on the constables, their reasonable suspicions having been aroused as to the contents of a bag by the instructions given by the first respondent to the fourth accused, they were endeavouring to prevent the latter from disposing of same. They were clearly acting in the execution of their duty.

For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the verdict of acquittal entered by the Judge on Appeal and restore the verdict and sentence passed on the respondents by the Trial Magistrate. The court below to carry out this order.


Appeal allowed; Magistrate's Judgment restored.